



Prisoners of war have always been, and continue to be, at the 
complete mercy of the Detaining Power. The rules which have evolved 
with respect to prisoners of war have uniformly had the objective of 
affording them protection against the all-powerful Detaining Power; 
but rules for the protection of prisoners of war are of value only 
if there are methods of ensuring compliance therewith.1 Over the 
years a number of institutions have come into existence for the ac-
complishment of this purpose, including: (1) the Protecting Power; 
(2) the prisoners' representative; (3) the International Committee 
of the Red Cross; and (4) other international humanitarian organ-
izations. While some of these institutions have other functions, a major 
function of eacn, and the one which will concern us here, is to ensure 
that the prisoners of war receive the full protection accorded to them 
by the Convention. We shall endeavor to ascertain the nature of each 
of these institutions, the powers that have been allocated to them, and 
the manner in which those powers are exercised. 
B. THE PROTECTING POWER! 
1. Historical 
The earliest indication of what we now term the Protecting Power 
probably appeared in the Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire of 
1 We have already discussed the problem of compliance in the broad sense-the 
acceptance of the applicability of the Convention generally in the international 
armed conflict in which a Power is engaged. See pp. 26-34 supra. Here, we are 
concerned with ensuring compliance with the specifics of the Convention. 
2 A Protecting Power is a State which has accepted the responsibility of protect-
ing the interests of a second State in the territory of a third, with which, for some 
reason, such as war, the second State does not maintain diplomatic relations. 1973 
Draft Additional Protocol, Article 2 (d), at 3; Article 2 (c), 1977 Protocol I; Sior-
det, Scrutiny 3. All three States must agree before the Prd.;ecting Power may 
serve as such. Heckenroth, Puissances protectrices 27-31, & 64; Draper, Imple-
mentation 46-47. In the terminology which we are using here, the second State 
is the Power of Origin and the third State is the Detaining Power. If the Protect-
ing Power is acting as such when no state of war exists, the State in whose terri-
tory it is acting is more properly called the Power of Residence. (After the break-
off' of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba in 1961, Switzer-
land acted as the Protecting Power for the United States in Cuba and Czechoslov-
akia acted as the Protecting Power for Cuba in ~he United States.) 
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the sixteenth century.3 Curiously, in those early days protection of 
nonnationals came about not as a result of agreements reached with 
the Power of Residence by the Power of Origin, but as a result of 
agreements reached with the Power of Residence by the prospective 
Protecting Power itself-the latter having probably been primarily 
concerned with the resulting increase in its own prestige and influ-
ence in the territory in which it was acting and in the home territo-
ries of the protected persons. At that period the Protecting Power 
was, and in the three succeeding centuries it remained, completely 
a creature of custom and usage, with no conventional basis, definition, 
or functions. As a result, the extent of the activity of Protecting 
Powers varied in different countries and even, with respect to differ-
ent Protecting Powers, within the same country. The passage of time 
resulted in the passing of the initiative for the designation of a Pro-
tecting Power in a particular case from the Protecting Power to the 
Power of Origin, where it more properly belonged. It also resulted 
in the concept of the Protecting Power as an international institution 
becoming more and more firmly entrenched in customary international 
law and practice. In its present form, however, the Protecting Power 
dates back only one century-and its codified form is of even more 
recent vintage. 
Most writers attribute the modern genesis of the Protecting Power 
to developments which occurred during the Franco-Prussian War 
(1870-71). In that conflict, probably for the first time, all of the 
belligerents were represented by Protecting Powers in the territory 
of the enemy. Great Britain was charged with the protection of the 
French in Germany; and the United States, Russia, and Switzerland 
acted as Protecting Powers in France for the various German States.4 
It may be said that the expansion of the functions of the Protecting 
Power during this conflict was, in large measure, due to two practices 
which originated during its course: that of expelling enemy consuls; 
and that of imposing stringent restrictions on enemy aliens.1i Un-
3 Isolated instances of this practice had occurred earlier. Thus, for ex' ample, we 
find that in the thirteenth century the Venetian Resident in Constantinople was 
charged with the protection of Armenians and Jews. The appearance of the Pro-
tecting Power has been attributed to a combination of three older institutions of 
international law: extraterritoriality; the employment of foreigners as diplomatic 
and consular agents; and the use of personal good offices. Franklin, Protection 
7-29. It is doubtful that the concept of the Protecting Power as it first appeared 
in the Turkish Capitulations had any more direct progenitor. 
4 Franklin, Protection 29 & 39. Eroglu, La repreesentation 10-12. Detailed infor-
mation concerning the designation of Protecting Powers in most of the conflicts 
mentioned herein may be found in this excellent study, at 10-29. (Concerning the 
older institution of the "Prisoner-of-War Agent," see Article III of the Cartel for 
the Exchange of Prisoners of War between Great Britain and the United States 
(1813) and Basdevant, Deux conventions 5-6.) 
5 Franklin, Protection 29. 
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questionably, each of these practices could and did contribute to the 
need for the enlargement of the functions of the Protecting Power. 
The precedents established during the Franco-Prussian War were 
adhered to in most subsequent international armed conflicts, many 
of which had, however, their own peculiar aspects. Thus, in the Sino-
Japanese War (1894-95) each side requested the United States to act 
as its Protecting Power, and so we find the same State acting as the 
Protecting Power for each belligerent within the territory of the 
other.o Similarly, Germany acted as the Protecting Power for both 
belligerents in the ltalo-Turkish War (1911-12) and in the Sino-
Soviet War (1929). Going to the other extreme, in the Greco-Turkish 
War (1897), Germany acted as the Protecting Power for Turkey in 
Greece, while three other nations-England, France, and Russia-
acted jointly for Greece in Turkey; in the Spanish-American War 
(1898), England acted as the Protecting Power for the United States, 
while France and Austria-Hungary acted jointly for Spain [it was 
during this conflict that, for the first time recorded, a belligerent, (the 
United States) specifically requested neutral inspection of installa-
tions within which prisoners of war were being held7]; and during 
the Balkan Wars (1912-13) France and Russia acted jointly as the 
Protecting Power for Montenegro. This practice of using more than 
one neutral State as a Protecting Power has since almost disappeared, 
although at one time during World War II Spain was acting as the 
Protecting Power for Japan in the continental United States, while 
Sweden acted for her in Hawaii, and Switzerland in American 
Samoa.8 
The Boer War (1899-1902) may, perhaps, be considered to have 
been (at least to some extent) an exception to what was fast becom-
ing a firmly established institution of international law. Early in that 
conflict the British requested the United States to represent their in-
terests with the Boers. Apparently the consent of the Boers was not 
sought and they not only failed to designate a Protecting Power of 
their own, but, for all practical purposes, at first refused to recognize 
the right of the United States consular representatives to act on be-
half of the British. Subsequently, the Boers did agree to permit the 
United States consuls in their territory to perform certain specific 
and limited functions with respect to British prisoners of war, upon 
the understanding that United States consuls in Great Britain would, 
and would be permitted to, perform similar functions with respect 
o For the very interesting instructions issued by the United States to its Consul 
in Peking, see [1894]1 For. Rel. U.S. 106-08 (1895). 
7 Flory, Prisoners of War 107-08. 
8 Franklin, Protection 164. 
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to Boer prisoners of war held there.9 Thus, to a limited degree, the 
institution of the Protecting Power was recognized even in that con-
flict. 
The Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) found the Protecting Powers 
once again exercising the full powers which it had become customary 
to assign them. Perhaps as a result of the favorable experiences of 
the Sino-Japanese War, immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities 
Japan requested the United States to act on its behalf in Russia; while 
France was designated by Russia as its Protecting Power in Japan 
and Korea. And once again, but to an even greater extent than during 
the Spanish-American War, we find the representatives of the Protect-
ing Powers concerning themselves with the welfare of prisoners of 
war.l0 
Thus it can readily be seen that when World War I burst upon 
Europe, the designation of Protecting Powers by belligerents was a 
firmly established international custom, although the Protecting Pow-
er as an institution had yet to be the subject of international legis-
lation.l1 During the course of that conflict, four definite items of prog:-
ress occurred: first, public opinion in the belligerent nations achieved 
an ability to understand how a friendly neutral could represent, at 
times vigorously, an enemy belligerent and its nationals ;12 second, the 
use of the Protecting Power as a means of safeguarding the welfare 
of prisoners of war, although at first somewhat restricted, was later 
greatly extended and received rather general acceptance ;13 third, the 
9 Ibid., 68-70. 
10 Eroglu, La representation 23-25; Franklin, Protection 78-19. The latter states 
that on one occasion when an American Vice Consul was inspecting a prisoner-of-
war camp he was permitted to sample the meal which was then being given to 
Japanese prisoners of war. In view of all these precedents, it is particularly diffi-
cult to comprehend why the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences, both of which were 
sponsored by the Tsar of Russia, while codifying many customary rules concerning 
the treatment of prisoners of war, continued the silence of previous international 
conventions with respect to the institution of the Protecting Power. 
11 Franklin, Protection 94-95. For the instructions issued by United States Sec-
retary of State Bryan in August 1914, see 9 A.J.I.L Supp. 118 (1915); [1914] 
For. Rei. U.S. Supp 740-41 (1928). 
12 See Siordet, Scrutiny 7. World War I saw more men taken prisoner of war 
than in any previous conflict; and it likewise saw them held in captivity for longer 
periods of time. Both of these factors had the effect of focusing attention on pris-
oners of war. It was undoubtedly this situation which led to the more general 
acceptance of the idea of a wider use of Protecting Powers in the interests of 
prisoners of war. Pictet, Commentary 93-94. 
1:1 Strangely, Germany, which had frequently acted as a Protecting Power, and 
the United States, which had not only frequently acted as a Protecting Power, but 
was probably the protagonist of the extension of the functions of the Protecting 
Power with respect to prisoners of war prior to its own entry into World War I, 
were the two most important belligerents to resist the activities of Protecting 
Powers. At the beginning of that War, Germany instituted rigid restrictions on 
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practice was adopted that when a neutral which had been acting as 
a Protecting Power itself became embroiled in the conflict, a successor 
Protecting Power would be designated to fill the vacuum;14 and, fi-
nally, the Protecting Power received legal recognition as an interna-
tional institution in a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements 
entered into by various of the belligerents during the course of the 
hostilities in which, to a surprising extent, its functions were spelled 
out with some degree of definitenessY' 
The precedents established during World War I were destined to 
bear fruit.lO A draft prisoner-of-war convention prepared in 1921 by 
the rCRC, while contemplating the use of Protecting Powers for cer-
tain limited purposes, would have assigned to the rCRC the respon-
sibility for establishing mobile commissions composed of neutrals 
charged with assuring that the belligerents were complying with the 
convention. This proposal was probably due to two factors: first, the 
failure of the States which had acted as Protecting Powers during 
World War I adequately to report their activities; and, second, the 
belief that the duties involved in the effective protection of the rights 
of prisoners of war exceeded the capacity of the diplomatic personnel 
of the Protecting Powers.17 However, when the Diplomatic Confer-
ence convened in Geneva in 1929 and drafted the convention which 
subsequently received the ratifications of the vast majority of States, 
the rCRC proposal was not adopted; instead, the basic prjnciple of 
the Protecting Power received general acceptance, the former Pro-
tecting Powers taking the position that all that was needed to assure 
their activities was that their role "should be distinctly set out, and 
their task clearly defined."18 The 1929 Prisoner-of-War Convention 
visits by neutrals to its prisoner-of-war camps. By 1916 these restrictions had, 
due largely to the efforts of the United States, for the most part disappeared. Yet 
when the United States became a belligerent in 1917, the United States Secretary 
of War took the position that Germany had no right to designate the Swiss to in-
spect American prisoner-of-war camps unless under treaty law. Flory, Prisoners 
of War 108-09. His position was apparently overruled by President Wilson and 
the Swiss were permitted to make such inspections. 
14 Eroglu, La representation 27-28. 
IG All of the bilateral and multilateral agreements cited in note I-39 supra had 
references to the Protecting Power. The 1918 Agreement between the United 
States and Germany cited therein referred to the Protecting Power in no less than 
25 separate articles. 
16 Franklin, Protection 99-100, states, or perhaps somewhat overstates, that a 
plan for the operations of the Protecting Power proposed by the still-neutral 
United States in 1915, and accepted by the British and German Governments with 
broadening modifications, "gained world-wide recognition and paved the way which 
led to the prisoner of war convention signed ... at Geneva on July 27, 1929." 
17 R!'smussen, Code des prisonniers de guerre 56. 
18 Siordet, Scrutiny 12. Twenty years and one World War later, we again find 
them urging that the Protecting Power be given the benefit of "well-defined and 
precise provisions." 2B Final Record 19. 
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thus became the first international agreement negotiated in time of 
peace to give official recognition to the institution of the Protecting 
Power.19 However, it did not create a new international concept. It 
did not make the use of the Protecting Power by belligerents obliga-
tory. It did not affect the relationships which had previously existed 
between the Power of Origin, the Protecting Power, and the Detain-
ing Power. It did give the relationship a formal and agreed status 
which it had not previously had.20 It may well be considered that the 
provisions of the 1929 Convention relating to Protecting Powers con-
stituted the most important advance contained in that Convention over 
the provisions relating to prisoners of war contained in the 1907 
Hague Regulations. The lessons learned during World War I had not 
been forgotten. 
The advent of World War II provided, all too soon, an opportunity 
for the implementation and testing of this novel international legis-
lation. Most of the belligerents were represented by Protecting Powers 
and, in general, these found the provisions of the 1929 Convention 
relating to their activities extremely helpful, even if not as all-inclu-
sive as they might have preferred. True, the designation and func-
tioning of Protecting Powers on behalf of prisoners of war had 
previously become an almost universally accepted custom of the 
international law of war. But it is necessary to bear in mind that, 
despite this, in the Soviet Union and in Japan, neither of which 
nations was a party to the 1929 Convention, there was either complete 
or substantial failure in the functioning of the Protecting Powers.!!1 
19 Seitz, La Suisse 34. 
20 Franklin, Protection 115; Janner, Puissance protectrice 49. 
!!1 The Soviet Union took the position that as it was a Party to the Fourth Hague 
Convention of 1907, the Regulations annexed to which, it asserted, covered "all the 
main questions of the regime of captivity" (but not the question of the Protecting 
Power, see note 10 supra), there was no need for it to consider an Italian proposal 
to apply reciprocally the provisions of the 1929 Convention (1 ICRC Report 412). 
While Japan stated its intention to "apply this Convention mutatis mutandis, to 
all prisoners of war" (ibid., 443), the Protecting Powers were never permitted to 
function in Japan in a manner even remotely resembling their manner of function-
ing in the territories and, particularly, the occupied territories of most of the 
other belligerents. I.M.T.F.E. 1127-36; Franklin, Protection 129-34. As a result 
of the foregoing, and of the disappearance of many Powers of Origin during the 
course of the hostilities, the ICRC has estimated that during World War II ap-
proximately 70 percent of all prisoners of war were deprived of the services of a 
Protecting Power. 2B Final Record 21; de La Pradelle, Nouvelles conventions 226. 
Thus, Germany denied the status of States to Poland, Yugoslavia, France, and 
Belgium (after the 1940 armistice agreements), Free France and Italy (after 
Mussolini's overthrow in 1943), and refused to permit the intervention of Protect-
ing Powers on behalf of their captured personnel. Pictet, Recueil 87-88. After 
World War II ended, the Swiss made a detailed report of their manifold activities 
as a Protecting Power. Seitz, La Suisse 34. 
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In general, the fact that such a large number of countries were 
parties to the World War II hostilities had two distinct but related 
results. In the first place, not only did the absence of strong neutrals 
present a problem in the selection of Protecting Powers, but it also 
meant that there was no large neutral world public opinion to be 
affected by violations of the Convention; and, in the second place, 
because of the small number of neutrals available to act as Protecting 
Powers, it frequently occurred that the same neutral was designated 
to act as the Protecting Power for two opposing belligerents. 
Once again wartime lessons were not forgotten and, just four years 
later, the 1949 Prisoner-of-War Convention was signed in which, as 
we shall see, the functions of the Protecting Power are identified and 
defined with far greater particularity than had been the case in the 
1929 Convention.22 Unfortunately, in not one of the numerous in-
stances of international armed conflict& which have occurred since 1949 
has the institution of the Protecting Power been utilized.23 
From the foregoing brief historical survey, it is apparent that prior 
to 1870 only the precursors of the modern Protecting Power existed, 
and not the latter itself; that during the period from 1870 to 1914 
the concept of the use of the Protecting Power began to take form, 
particularly with respect to the problem of the prisoner of war; and 
that. during the period subsequent to 1914, the form has become 
definite, the institution of the Protecting Power having become the 
subject of numerous bilateral and multilateral international agree-
ments, culminating in the 1949 Convention to which most of the na-
tions of the world are parties.24 It now becomes appropriate to an-
22 References to the Protecting Power are contained in 36 of its 132 substantive 
articles, as well as in two of its Annexes. 
23 U.N., Human Rights, A/7720, sec. 213. But see Pictet, Humanitarian Law 66 
and note 29 infra. In Korea and in Vietnam the ICRC performed the humanitarian 
functions of the Protecting Power on one side (in South Korea and in South Viet-
nam) but was not allowed to do so on the other. In the Indo-Pakistani Wars (1965 
and 1971), the Middle East Wars (1967 and 1973), and the Honduran-Salvador 
Conflict (1969), the ICRC performed these functions on both sides. (In the India-
Portugal War (1961) a Protecting Power already existed becaus~ of a prior break 
in diplomatic relations.) 
24 See Appendix B. The use of the institution of the Protecting Power has since 
been resorted to in Article 21 of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, where it is adopted as a means 
of overseeing the protection of inanimate objects-which is, actually, merely a 
variation of the protection furnished historically by a Protecting Power, a very 
large part of its energy having once been directed toward the protection of the 
embassy buildings and diplomatic archives of the Protected Power. See also, 
Articles 45 and 46 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 
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alyze the form and the character which the Protecting Power received 
during this evolutionary process.25 
2. The Modern Concept of the Protecting Power 
a. DESIGNATION 
Article 86 of the 1929 Convention was, to say the least, somewhat 
vaguely worded: 
The High Contracting Parties recognize that the regular appli-
cation of the present Convention will find a guaranty in the 
possibility of collaboration of the protecting Powers charged 
with safeguarding the interests of belligerents. . . . (Emphasis 
added.) 
There is nothing mandatory here. There is no requirement here that 
a Protecting Power actually be designated or that, if designated, it 
be permitted to function as such by the Detaining Power. The com-
parable provision of the 1949 Convention reads quite differently. 
Article 8 (1) of the latter Convention reads: 
The present Convention shall be applied with the cooperation 
and under the scrutiny of the Protecting Powers whose duty 
it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict. . . . 
(Emphasis added.)26 
It would appear that it was intended that the designation of Pro-
tecting Powers become at least a moral obligation of the belligerents; 
and that, once designated, a Protecting Power has a duty not only to 
the Power of Origin27 but also to the other parties to the conflict, 
25 As was aptly stated by one author: "What happened was that an existing 
usage was taken, and transformed into a regulation. It was the organ which 
created the function." Siordet, Scrutiny 3. 
26 This provision has been termed "the keystone" of the 1949 Convention. Ying-
ling & Ginnane 397. In the British Manual para. 276, the Protecting Power is 
termed "the principal organ, apart from the Contracting Parties themselves, for 
ensuring the observance of the execution of the Convention." It is therefore indeed 
distressing to find that while Soviet International Law states (at 421) that "citi-
zens of a belligerent who remain on enemy territory are under the protection of 
some neutral country," nowhere in the comparatively detailed discussion of the 
1949 Prisoner-of-War Convention (at 431-34) is there even any passing reference 
to such a right of protection for prisoners of war or to the provisions of the Con-
vention relating to Protecting Powers. 
21 It must be borne in mind that a Protecting Power is not a general agent of 
the Power of Origin. One author has defined the overall relationship between these 
two Powers as follows: "The protecting Power does not act in its own name but 
rather as a kind of caretaker or intermediary. Nevertheless, it acts independently 
in so far as the State whose interest it protects cannot demand, but only request, 
it to perform certain services, and the protecting Power itself decides the way in 
which it discharges its mission. Nor maya belligerent give instructions to those 
organs of the protecting Power which carry out this mission. Instead, requests to 
the protecting Power have to be made through diplomatic channels. The protecting 
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to perform the functions which have been assigned to it by the Con-
vention.28 But if it was the intention of the 1949 Diplomatic Confer-
ence to make the designation of Protecting Powers mandatory in 
international armed conflicts, the Convention has been totally unsuc-
cessful in accomplishing that purpose; for, as has been mentioned, 
there has not been a single Protecting Power designated pursuant 
to Article 8 since the Convention was drafted and entered into effect 
-and there has certainly been no lack of international armed con-
flict during that period. The importance of this failure cannot be over-
estimated.20 
The lCRC has identified three major reasons why the institution 
of the Protecting Power has not been utilized in the international 
armed conflicts which have taken place since the Convention became 
effective: 
(1) The designation of a Protecting Power might be inter-
preted as the recognition of the enemy belligerent; 
(2) Despite the armed conflict, diplomatic relations were not 
broken off by the belligerents; 
(3) The existence of a general reluctance, because of the pro-
visions of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, to 
admit the existence of and participation in international armed 
conflict.30 
It is possible to draft provisions which would effectively eliminate 
the first two bases for failing to designate a Protecting Power. It 
would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to draft a provision 
which would eliminate the third reason. 
Power may refuse to act when compliance with a request would be contrary to its 
own interests or infringe the lawful right of the enemy State." Castren 92. See 
also, Franklin, Protection 114. 
28 Siordet has stated that the designation of a Protecting Power is no longer 
optional but is now "almost obligatory"; that it is now put in the "imperative 
form"; and that in performing its mission the Protecting Power is no longer the 
special representative of one of the parties, but is "the representative of all the 
Contracting Parties to the Convention." Siordet, Scrutiny 36. See also, 1971 GE 
Documentation, II, at 11-12. 
2fJ In Pictet, Humanitarian Law 66, the statement is made that Protecting 
Powers have been designated in three instances since World War II: Suez (1956) ; 
Goa (1961); and Bangladesh (1971). Forsythe, Who Guards the Guardians 46-47 
accepts that statement in its entirety. However, it is subject to major qualifica-
tions; in fact, it is arguable that none of these three instances can really be said 
to constitute the designation of a Protecting Power pursuant to Article 8 of the 
1949 Convention. 
One of the leading military-academic scholars in this field has said: "To talk of 
the regular application of international humanitarian law without the effective 
functioning of some Protecting Power system ••. is idle chatter!' Draper, Imple-
mentation 47. Elsewhere the same author has said that "the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 are virtually inoperative without the active role and participation of the 
Protecting Power system!' Ibid., 46. 
30 1971 GE Documentation, II, at 16-17. For a lengthier list of reasons, see Abi-
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The future is far from bright with respect to the overall solution 
of this problem, and this has received wide recognition. Area special-
ists are able to find little or no evidence that any Communist country 
-given the "spy-phobia" complexes with which all are afHicted-
will ever allow a Protecting Power to function in its territory,31 no 
matter how the provisions of the Convention relating to the designa-
tion of Protecting Powers are strengthened and clearly made man-
datory. Some time ago the United Nations General Assembly, after 
shying away from the subject for many years, officially recognized 
the prior lack of, and the future need for, recourse to the institution 
of the Protecting Power.32 Innumerable private international organi-
zations have sought a solution to the problem.33 At the very initia-
tion of its proposal to review the need for the reaffirmation and 
development of international humanitarian law applicable in armed 
conflicts, the ICRC emphasized the problem in this area,34 and the 
Conference of Government Experts convened by the ICRC in 1971 
discussed the subject at great length.35 The ICRC attempted to draft 
a provision which would not only make the designation of a Protecting 
Power practically mandatory, but would also eliminate several of the 
reasons, enumerated above, for the past failures to designate Pro-
tecting Powers.36 The 1972 Conference of Government Experts once 
again discussed the matter at length,37 this time in the context of the 
ICRC proposal and of the many substitute and amendatory proposals 
Saab, Le renforcement du systeme du droit humanitaire, XII/2 Revue de droit 
penal militaire et de droit de la guel're 227-28. 
31 Miller, The Law of War 224, 241-42, & 254. These conclusions are undoubtedly 
based at least in part on the actions of the Soviet Union during World War II; the 
events in Korea (1950-53); the Sino-Indian War (1962); and Vietnam (c. 1965-
73). Nevertheless, in commenting on the proposals contained in U.N., Human 
Rights, A/8052, Ch. XI, concerning the possibility of new machinery to replace 
the Protecting Power, the Soviet Union said that "it must be stated that existing 
institutions should be used to supervise the application of humanitarian rules in 
armed conflict." U.N., Human Rights, A/8313, at 68. The cynic might interpret 
this to mean that the Soviet Union prefers a moribund, inoperative Protecting 
Power rather than a new, vital, mandatory institution, created for the purpose of 
ensuring that belligerents will apply, and will comply with, the provisions of the 
Convention. 
32 G.A. Res. 2852, 20 December 1971, Respect for human rights in armed con-
flicts, 26 GAOR, Supp. 29, at 90, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1972). See also U.N., Human 
Rights, A/7720, § 213. 
33 See 1971 GE Documentation, II, at 22. See also 1972 I.L.A. Rep. 305, 308; 
U.N., Human Rights, A/8370, § 165. 
34 1969 Reaffirmation 87-91; 1971 GE Documentation, II, at 10-34. 
35 1971 GE Rep:>rt, paras. 532-51. 
3111972 Busic Te .• ·ts 6; 1972 Commentary 14-19. 
37 1972 GE Report, I, at paras. 4.56-4.58, & 5.24. 
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that had been submitted by the experts of the various nations.3s Out 
of this discussion emerged a new proposal that was submitted to the 
Diplomatic Conference.30 
Article 5 of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol relating to inter-
national armed conflicts contained six paragraphs, the first five of 
which are relevant to the problem under discussion. Paragraph 1 
provided that from the outset of international armed conflict, as spe-
cified in Article 2 of the 1949 Convention, each belligerent "shall 
without delay designate a Protecting Power . . . and . . . permit the 
activities of a Protecting Power designated by the adverse Party 
and accepted as such." Obviously, this was merely an iteration of a 
fundamental, customary rule of international law and no real solution 
to the problem. True, the belligerents were being told in grammatically 
authoritative language (shall) that they were to make use of and to 
permit the enemy to make use of the Protecting Power; but once again 
there would be no automatic remedy for the situation created where 
a belligerent disregarded, or even affirmatively refused to comply 
with, the requirements of the paragraph.40 
In paragraph 2 an attempt was made to solve the foregoing prob-
lem. It provided that where there was "disagreement or unjustified 
delay" in the designation of Protecting Powers, the ICRC "shall offer 
its good offices"-not to perform the functions of the Protecting Pow-
ers but merely to assist in their selection: it was therein authorized 
to ask each belligerent for "a list of at least five States which they 
3S Ibid., II, 97-104 passim. 'For a discussion of the proposal in this regard made 
by the U.S. experts, see Baxter, Perspective: the Evolving Law of Armed Con-
flicts. 60 Mil. L. Rev. 99, 109-10 (1973). 
3D Article 5 of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol; and 1973 Commentary 11-14. 
That Article was discussed, amended, and adopte!I by Committee I of the 1975 
Diplomatic Conference. 1975 Report of Committee I, at 10-17; The Committee's 
proposal was adopted in toto by the Diplomatic Conference with only minor edit-' 
orial changes. 
40 The 1973 Conference of Government Experts had discussed the possibility of 
a procedure for the automatic designation of Protecting Powers but had decided 
against it. 1973 Commentary 12. The provisions actually adopted by the Diplomatic 
Conference as Article 5 (1) and (2) of the 1977 Protocol I read: 
Article 5-Appointment of Protecting Powers and of their substitute 
1. It is the duty of the Parties to a conflict from the beginning of that con-
flict to secure the supervision and implementation of the Conventions and of 
this Protocol by the application of the system of Protecting Powers, including 
inter alia the designation and acceptance of those Powers, in accordance with 
the following paragraphs. Protecting Powers shall have the duty of safe-
guarding the interests of the Parties to the conflict. 
2. From the beginning of a situation referred to in Article 1, each Party to 
the conflict shall without delay designate a Protecting Power for the purpose 
of applying the Conventions and this Protocol and shall, likewise without 
delay and for the same purpose, permit the activities of a Protecting Power 
which has been accepted by it as such after designation by the adverse Party. 
consider acceptable" ;41 the lists "shall be communicated" within 10 
days; and if any State is on both lists, the ICRC is to seek its agree-
ment.42 And paragraph 3 included alternative proposals for the con-
sideration of the Diplomatic Conference as to the procedure to be 
followed if, despite the provisions of paragraph 2, no Protecting 
Powers were designated: (1) the ICRC could offer to assume the 
functions of a substitute for the Protecting Powers if the adverse 
belligerents agreed "and insofar as those functions are compatible 
with its own activities"; or (2) the belligerents "shall accept" the 
offer of the ICRC to act as a substitute for the Protecting Powers.43 
The first alternative still made it possible for a belligerent to prevent 
the ultimate designation of a Protecting Power or a substitute for a 
Protecting Power; the second alternative made it mandatory that the 
offer of the ICRC be accepted by the belligerents. 
41 It was not clear whether a belligerent would be suggesting States which it 
desired to have act as a Protecting Power on its behalf, or which it would be will-
ing to accept on its territory as a Protecting Power for the adverse Party, or both. 
However, this has been clarified in Article 5 {3} of the 1977 Protocol!. See note 42 
infra. 
42Presumably, the inclusion of the name of a State on the two lists would mean 
that it was acceptable to both belligerents and only its consent would then be 
needed for the trilateral agreement that is required. See note 2 supra, and note 50 
infra. The provision actually adopted by the Diplomatic Conference as Article 5 {3} 
reads: 
3. If a Protecting Power has not been designated or accepted from the be-
ginning of a situation referred to in Article 1, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, without prejudice to the right of any other impartial humani-
tarian organization to do likewise, shall offer its good offices to the Parties to 
the conflict with a view to the designation without delay of a Protecting Power 
to which the Parties to the conflict consent. For that purpose it may, inter alia, 
ask each Party to provide it with a list of at least five States which that Party 
considers acceptable to act as Protecting Power on its behalf in relation to an 
adverse Party, and ask each adverse Party to provide a list of at least five 
States which it would accept as the Protecting Power of the first Party; these 
lists shall be communicated to the Committee within two weeks after the re-
ceipt of the request; it shall compare them and seek the agreement of any 
proposed State named on both lists. 
{The ICRC is not instructed as to what action it is to take if, by chance, more 
than one State is named on both lists!} 
43 The ICRC had previously announced that it had decided that all of the func-
tions of the Protecting Power were humanitarian in nature and that they could, 
therefore, be performed by that organization. 1972 GE Report, I, para. 4.71 {at 
ISO}. See also, ibid., 208; and 1971 GE Report, paras. 553-54. The major contro-
versy in Committee I revolved around the choice between the two alternatives pro-
posed, as well as many suggested variations thereof. Article 5 {4} of the 1977 
Protocol I, as approved by the Diplomatic Conference, reads: 
4. If, despite the foregoing, there is no Protecting Power, the Parties to the 
conflict shall accept without delay an offer which may be made by the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross or by any other organization which offers 
all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy, after due consultations with the 
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Paragraph 4 was an attempt to eliminate one of the reasons some-
times advanced by belligerents as justification for their failure to 
utilize the institution of the Protecting Power in international armed 
conflict-the fear that this action would be interpreted as a recog-
nition of the enemy belligerent.44 It very specifically stated that the 
designation and acceptance of Protecting Powers "shall not affect the 
legal status of the Parties to the conflict or that of the territories 
over which they exercise authority."45 And paragraph 5 was an at-
tempt to eliminate another of the reasons that had previously been 
advanced by belligerents as justification for their failure to utilize 
the institution of the Protecting Power in international armed con-
flict-that diplomatic relations had not been broken off by the bellig-
erents.41l It provided in relevant part that "[t]he maintenance of dip-
lomatic relations ... does not constitute an obstacle to the appoint-
ment of Protecting Powers . . . ."47 Experience has demonstrated 
that even though diplomatic relations have not broken off, an enemy 
said Parties and taking into account the result of these consultations, to act 
as a sUbstitute. The functioning of such a substitute is subject to the consent 
of the Parties to the conflict; every effort shall be made by the Parties to the 
conflict to facilitate the operation of the substitute in the performance of its 
tasks under the Conventions and this Protocol. 
Concerning the "any other organizations" referred to above, see pp. 312-314 infra. 
44 The several Middle East conflicts (1956, 1967, 1973) presented this problem. 
Pilloud, Reservations 8. 
45 See also Article 4 of the 1977 Protocol 1. A provision to the same general 
effect may be found in Article 3 (4) of the 1949 Convention, dealing with noninter-
national armed conflicts, and for the same reason. Article 5(5) of the 1977 Pro-
tocol I as approved by the 1975 Diplomatic Conference reads: 
5. In accordance with article 4, the designation and acceptance of Protect-
ing Powers for the purpose of applying the Conventions and the Protocol shall 
not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict or of any territory, in-
cluding occupied territory. 
46 The major international armed conflict in which diplomatic relations were 
not broken off and in which this problem arose was the Sino-Indian War (1962). 
See Cohen & Chiu, People's China 1570-71; Cohen & Leng, The Sino-Indian Dis-
pute 298-300; Draper, Implementation 46. 
47 Article 5 (6) as adopted by the Committee I of the 1975 Diplomatic Confer-
ence was the proposed Article 5 (5) of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol with an 
addition which should make it even more difficult for a belligerent to use the exist-
ence of diplomatic relations as an excuse for failing to cooperate in the designation 
of Protecting Powers. Article 5 (6) of the 1977 Protocol I, as approved by the Dip-
lomatic Conference reads: 
6. The maintenance of diplomatic relations between Parties to the conflict 
or the entrusting of the protection of a Party's interests and those of its na-
tionals to a third State in accordance with the rules of international law relat-
ing to diplomatic relations is no obstacle to the designation of Protecting 
Powers for the purpose of applying the Conventions and this Protocol. 
(For a discussion in depth of the activities of the 1975 session of the Diplomatic 
Conference with respect to Article 5 of what became the 1977 Protocol I, see For-
sythe, Who Guards the Guardians.) 
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Embassy cannot function for the protection of its nationals, particu-
larly prisoners of war, to an extent even remotely equivalent to a 
neutral State acting as a Protecting Power.48 
What are the qualifications required for designation as a Protecting 
Power? It must, first of all, be a State within the meaning of that 
term in international law. It must also, of course, be a neutral State 
-and it is advisable that it be one which can reasonably be expected 
to remain neutral, although this latter qualification has become more 
and more difficult to assure. And, finally, it must be a State which 
maintains diplomatic relations with both the requesting State (the 
Power of Origin) and the State in the territory of which it is being 
requested to operate (the Detaining Power). 
How'does a State actually become a Protecting Power? The bellig-
erent State desiring the services of a Protecting Power (the Power 
of Origin) requests a neutral State which has the qualifications listed 
above to act on its behalf vis-a.-vis a specific enemy belligerent. If the 
neutral State is willing to assume the functions of a Protecting Pow-
er, it so notifies the requesting State. It must then obtain the concur-
rence of the enemy belligerent in whose territory it has been requested 
to function (the Detaining Power) .49 In other words, the actual des-
ignation of the Protecting Power is based upon the request of the 
Power of Origin and the consent of both the proposed Protecting 
Power and the Detaining Power.50 
48 Cohen & Leng, The Sino-Indian Dispute 278 & 320; Draper, People's Republic 
367; 1971 GE Report, para. 538. This does not apply to neutrals or cobelligerents 
and Article 4 (2) of the Fourth Convention provides that nationals of such Powers 
are not protected persons while diplomatic relations are maintained. There is no 
such provision with respect to nationals of enemy Powers. In the Third Convention 
the sole reference to the effect of the continuance of diplomatic relations is in that 
portion of Article 4B (2) which is concerned with members of the armed forces of 
belligerents in the territory of neutral or "non-belligerent" Powers. This is indica-
tive of the fact that the 1949 Diplomatic Conference did not intend that the con-
tinuing presence of enemy diplomatic personnel in the territory of a belligerent 
should nullify the provisions of the Convention concerning Protecting Powers. The 
1972 Conference of Government Experts apparently felt quite strongly about this. 
1973 Commentary 164; 1972 GE Report, I, paras. 4.56-4.79. 
49 Heckenroth, Puissances protectrices 74. This is the step that the United States 
apparently failed to take when it was requested to perform the functions of the 
Protecting Power by Great Britain during the Boer War (1899-1902), See p. 257 
supra: 
50 The 1949 Convention contains no provisions with respect to the method of des-
ignating a Protecting Power, the required qualifications for a Protecting Power, 
etc., leaving these problems to be governed by the relevant rules of customary in.-
ternational law. Heckenroth, Puissances protectrices 62 & 224. The 1973 Draft 
Additional Protocol proposed, in Article 2 (d), to define the term "Protecting 
Power" as meaning "a State not engaged in the conflict, which, designated by a 
Party to the conflict and accepted by the adverse Party, is prepared to carry out 
the functions assigned to a Protecting Power under the Conventions and the pres-
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As we have seen, it has frequently occurred in the past that more 
than one State has been designated as the Protecting Power for a 
belligerent. 51 There is nothing in the 1949 Convention, nor in general 
international law, to preclude this practice. However, the advantages 
of the other extreme-one and the same Protecting Power for oppos-
ing belligerents-are many. Even a small nation, when acting as the 
Protecting Power for both sides, is in a unique position to obtain a 
general observance of the law of war by each belligerent on the basis 
of reciprocity. This was made quite apparent during World War II, 
when Switzerland acted as the Protecting Power for many of the 
belligerents on both sides of that conflict. 52 The limited number of 
States that would be available and competent to act as Protecting 
Powers in any future maj or international armed conflict might once 
again bring about this result. 53 
b. SUBSTITUTES FOR PROTECTING POWERS 
In the light of events of World War II, the delegates at the 1949 
Diplomatic Conference could not but foresee the possibility of situa-
tions in which there would be no Protecting Power fo stand between 
the Detaining Power and the prisoner of war.54 They attempted to 
ent Protocol." This provision, with some useful editing, was eventually approved 
by the Diplomatic Conference as Article 2(c) of the 1977 Protocol!' It reads: 
(c) "Protecting Power" means a neutral or other State not a Party to the 
conflict which has been designated by a Party to the conflict and accepted by 
the adverse Party and has agreed to carry out the functions assigned to a 
Protecting Power under the Conventions and this Protocol. 
lil See pp. 256-257 supra. 
52 Pictet, Commentaru 95-96. The same conclusion was reached in Franklin, 
Protection 164-65, where this statement appears: "For uniformity and simplicity 
of administration it is obviously desirable for the protected power [Power of 
Origin] to entrust its interests in another country to only one protecting power, 
and in instances involving the protection of belligerent interests there are advan-
tages to all concerned if both belligerents entrust their interests in the other's 
territory to the same protecting power •... The experience of World War II indi-
cates that a more uniform administration and a higher standard of treatment of 
enemy interests by both belligerents result from a reciprocal protection of the in-
terests of those belligerents by the same protecting power throughout the territor-
ies under the control of each belligerent." In 1945 Switzerland alone represented 35 
belligerents, and in many cases it represented both of opposing belligerents in the 
territory of the other. Janner, Puissance protectrice 24 and Annexe I, at 68-70. 
(Eroglu, La representation, Annexe III, at 144-48, lists only 34, but he omits 
Yugoslavia. ) 
53 One author has suggested the possibility that in a future international armed 
conflict the demand for Protecting Powers may exceed the supply available. De La 
Pradelle, Nouvelles conventions 225. Of course, since that was written the number 
of States in the world community has more than doubled and many of these new 
SOVereign entities would probably be available to act, and would be fully capable of 
acting, as Protecting Powers. 
54 For some of these possible situations see Siordet, Scrutiny 48-53; and Heck-
enroth, Puissances protectrices 229-36. 
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solve this problem, in all its varied facets, by providing in Article 10 
of the Convention a number of methods for the designation of "sub-
stitutes" for Protecting Powers.55 It must, however, be emphasized 
that the provisions of this Article should not be considered as affect-
ing the basic method of selecting either the original Protecting Power 
or successor Protecting Powers as long as the Power of Origin con-
tinues to exist and to be able to function in its sovereign capacity. 
A successor Protecting Power, necessitated, perhaps, because the orig-
inal Protecting Power has become a belligerent, is not a "substitute" 
for a Protecting Power within the meaning of Article 10, and its 
designation is governed by the same rules of customary international 
law as those which govern the designation of the original Protecting 
Power. 56 It must also be noted that a State or organization designated 
under the provisions of Article 10 is not a "Protecting Power" as that 
term is used generally in international law and as it is used else-
where in the Convention, but is merely a State or organization per-
forming some or all of the functions allocated to Protecting Powers 
by the various relevant provisions of the Convention. 57 
55 A substitute for the Protecting Power exercises all of the powers and per-
forms all of the functions of a Protecting Power. See Article 10 (6). Concerning 
the French proposal for an ongoing international organization to serve as the sub-
stitute for the Protecting Power and the 1949 Diplomatic Conference's decision to 
refer it to the governments by resolution, see p. 18 supra. The Soviet Union 
opposed both the French proposal and the adoption of the resolution, stating as to 
the latter that it "sees no need to consider this question or to create such a body, 
since the problem of the Protecting Powers has been satisfactorily solved by the 
Conventions established at the present Conference." Declaration made by the Dele-
gation of the Soviet Union at the time of the signing of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions, 1 Final Record, 201. The validity of that statement is considerably reduced 
by the fact that both the French proposal and the resolution pertained to sub-
stitutes for Protecting Powers under Article 10-and the Soviet Union made a 
reservation to that Article. See text, pp. 273-274 infra. 
5S Pictet, Commentary 117-18. Thus, when Spain 'vithdrew as the Protecting 
Power for Japan in the continental United States on 30 March 1945, the Japanese 
Government requested Switzerland to act in that capacity, Switzerland agreed to 
do so, the United States gave its concurrence and, effective 21 July 1945, Switzer-
land assumed the functions of Protecting Power for Japan in the United States. 
Rich, Brief History 488. In this case Switzerland was a Protecting Power as suc-
cessor to Spain; it was not a substitute for a Protecting Power. 
57 Article 2 (e) of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol defined a "substitute" as 
"an organization acting in place of a Protecting Power for the discharge of all or 
part of its functions." 1973 Draft Additional Protocol 3. As adopted by Committee 
I and as approved by the Diplomatic Conference as Article 2(d) of the 1977 Pro-
tocol I, this provision now reads: 
(d) "substitute" means an organization acting in place of a Protecting 
Power in accordance with Article 5. 
Article 5 (6) of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol stated that whenever mention 
was made therein of a Protecting Power, this "also implies the substitute within 
the meaning of Article 2 (e)." 1973 Draft Additional Protocol 4. (This latter pro-
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The first paragraph of Article 10 authorizes the High Contracting 
Parties to agree "to entrust to an organization which offers all guar-
antees of impartiality and efficacy the duties incumbent on the Pro-
tecting Powers." It is on the basis of the foregoing that a legal 
foundation already exists for the various international organizations 
which have been proposed as substitutes for Protecting Powers ;58 
and it is here that the ICRC's recently expressed willingness to assume 
the functions of a substitute for a Protecting Power50 would be im-
plemented. Moreover, if this provision and the provisions of the second 
paragraph of Article 10, discussed immediately below, fail to produce 
a substitute for a Protecting Power, then under the third paragraph 
of Article 10 the Detaining Power "shall request or shall accept" the 
services of a humanitarian organization such as the ICRC to assume 
the humanitarian functions of the Protecting P ower. 60 
The second paragraph of Article 10 contains the controversial pro-
visions with respect to substitutes for Protecting Powers. It provides, 
in substance, that where, "no matter for what reason" (emphasis 
added), there is no Protecting Power (designated under Article 8) 
vision is substantially the same as Article 10, paragraph 6, of the 1949 Conven-
tion). With some minor editing Article 5 (6) of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol 
was adopted by the Diplomatic Conference as Article 5 (7) of the 1977 Protocol I. 
58 The French proposal, incorporated into Resolution 2 of the 1949 Diplomatic 
Conference, was an early example of such an organization. See note 55 supra. See 
also U.N., HU'TIULn Rights, A/7720, §§ 224-25; ibid., A/8052, paras. 245-50; 1971 
GE Report, §§ 540-48; 1972 Commentary 25-26. One of the major functions of the 
new international entity proposed by the present author (see pP. 19-20 supra) 
would be as an automatic substitute for a Protecting Power. See Levie ,Working 
Paper 11-14. (The "International Fact-Finding Commission" created by Article 90 
of the 1977 Protocol I does not have this function.) At the 1949 Diplomatic Con-
ference the ICRC representative indicated that the first paragraph of Article 10 
contemplated an agreement entered into in peacetime entrusting the functions of 
the Protecting Power to a named organization. 2B Final Record 61. While this is 
certainly a possibility, and is the basis for the prollosals herein referred to, there 
is no reason why it could not also be implemented by the belligerents in wartime. 
50 See note 43 supra. This expressed willingness on the part of the ICRC to act 
as a substitute for a Protecting Power was a complete reversal of policy. At the 
1949 Diplomatic Conference the ICRC representative had stated that the ICRC 
"could on no account be taken into consideration" to act as the organization con-
templated by the first paragraph of Article 10. 2B Final Record 61. 
60 It is here that the ICRC felt that it belonged when the statement quoted in 
note 59 supra was made. 2B Final ReCjjrd 63; Pictet, Commentary 119. However, 
inasmuch as it has now determined (!nd properly so) that all of the functions 
of a Protecting Power are humanitarian in nature (see note 43 supra), the differ-
ence between "the duties incumbent on the Protecting Powers," contained in the 
first paragraph of Article 10, and "the humanitarian functions performed by Pro-
tecting Powers," contained in the third paragraph of Article 10, has, for all prac-
tical purposes, disappeared. It must be borne in mind, however, that while the 
first paragraph of Article 10 requires the agreement of the Detaining Power and 
the Power of Origin, action under the third paragraph of Article 10 may be taken 
by the Detaining Power acting alone. Heckenroth, Puissance protectrices 263-65. 
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and no organization entrusted with the duties of the Protecting Power 
(pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 10), "the Detaining Power 
shall request a neutral State, or such an organization" to undertake 
to perform the functions assigned to the Protecting Powers by the 
Convention. On the surface this appears to be just one more effort 
to ensure the existence of a Protecting Power or of a substitute for a 
Protecting Power in the absence of an actual Protecting Power. The 
dispute which has arisen may be ascribed to the inclusion of the clause 
"no matter for what reason." This appears to give to the Detaining 
Power, acting alone, carte blanche to select a neutral State or an or-
ganization "which offers all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy" to 
perform the duties of a Protecting Power whenever for the moment 
there is no Protecting Power in being. This clause, and the entire 
paragraph, has been interpreted by some commentators as being lim-
ited in its application to instances in which the Power of Origin 
"intentionally abstains, or systematically refuses, to appoint a Pro-
tecting Power, or again, if it disappears entirely."61 However, it can 
be argued just as strongly, and possibly with more legal justification, 
that "no matter for what reason" means exactly what it says. The 
Soviet and other delegates at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference objected 
to the quoted clause in that they believed that the right of the Detain-
ing Power to act unilaterally in the selection of a substitute for a 
Protecting Power for the Power of Origin should be limited to situa-
tions in which the Power of Origin had ceased to exist.62 There is 
much merit to the argument. Where the Power of Origin continues to 
exist, no valid reason can be discerned for discarding the established 
and customary procedure for the selection of either the original Pro-
tecting Power or of a successor Protecting Power. 
It is true that there might be instances in which the Power of Origin 
fails to designate a Protecting Power-but that should not create a 
right in the Detaining Power to designate a substitute for the Pro-
tecting Power. Such a failure by the Power of Origin would in no 
manner affect the right of the Detaining Power, in its capacity as a 
Power of Origin, to designate a Protecting Power to act on its behalf 
in its enemy's territory. The Power of Origin that does arbitrarily 
refuse to designate a Protecting Power to act on its behalf may believe 
that it has good reasons for so doing-and it should not be told that if 
it does not take specific action to Pfovide protection for the captured 
members of its armed forces, its 'enemy, the Detaining Power, will 
have the right to do so. 
61 1971 GE Documentation, II at 13; accord, Knitel, Less Delegations du Comite 
International de la Croix-Rouge 88. Even in his attempt to justify the provisions 
of the second paragraph of Article 10, Siordet concedes that the provision is not 
"clear." Siordet, Scrutiny 59-60. 
62 2B Final Record 29, 347, & 351. 
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The major objection to the procedure contemplated by paragraph 
two of Article 10 is that situations may arise in which, through no 
fault of the Power of Origin, it has no Protecting Power, and, before 
it can take action to remedy this deficiency, the Detaining Power 
exercises its power under the second paragraph of Article 10, desig-
nating a weak and friendly "neutral" State as a substitute for a Pro-
tecting Power, and then refusing to concur in the designation of a 
true Protecting Power by the Power of Origin on the ground that 
there is no need for such a designation. To accomplish this it might 
refuse to concur in the designation of a Protecting Power named 
by the Power of Origin, or it might withdraw a concurrence previ-
ously given, or it might take action before a Protecting Power could 
be appointed at the onset of hostilities, or it might take action when a 
Protecting Power has withdrawn and there has not been time for the 
Power of Origin to go through the full procedure for the designation 
of a successor Protecting Power. All of these examples fall within the 
claul'le "no matter for what reason" ; in none of them is there justifica-
tion for unilateral action by the Detaining Power.63 
All of the Communist countries (and Portugal) made reservations 
to Article 10 to the general effect that they would not recognize as 
legal "requests by the Detaining Power to a neutral State or to a 
humanitarian organization, to undertake the functions performed by 
a Protecting Power, unless the consent of the Government of the coun-
try of which the prisoners of war are nationals has been obtained."&! 
While there is a perhaps not unnatural tendency to view with suspi-
cion this position, taken at Geneva almost uniquely by the Soviet Union 
and its satellites,65 it appears to have a valid basis. If there is a Power 
63 Pictet insists that the second paragraph of Article 10 "does not affect the 
process of appointment of the Protecting Power" and that successor Protecting 
Powers are not "substitutes" for prior Protecting Powers. Pictet, CommentaTY 
117-18. The latter statement is completely correct. See note 56 supra. While his 
statement indicates the opinion that this paragraph of Article 10 was not intend-
ed to affect the process of appointment of Protecting Powers, nowhere does he 
even attempt to explain the significance of the clause "no matter for what reason." 
64 Reservation of the Soviet Union to Article 10 of the 1949 Prisoner-of-War 
Convention, 191 U.N.T.S. 367, maintaining the reservations made at the time of 
signing, 75 U.N.T.S. 458-60, and 1 Final Record 355. The other reservations to 
Article 10 are substantially identical to the foregoing (minor differences are prob-
ably due to translations from different languages), except that Hungary specified 
that Article 10 "can only be applied if the Government of the State of which the 
protected persons are nationals, no longer exists." Reservation of the Hungarian 
People's Republic, 198 U.N.T.S. 338; 1 Final Record, 347. It would be interesting 
to learn why the words "country of which the prisoners of war [protected per-
sons] are nationals" (emphasis added) were used rather than "country of which 
the prisoners of war are members of the armed forces." 
65 See, e.g., Brockhaus, The U.S.S.R. 291. All of the Communist and Communist-
oriented countries which have adhered to the Convention since 1949 have made 
similar reservations to Article 10. 
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of Origin in esse, not only is its consent to the designation of a Pro-
tecting Power to act on its behalf essential, but it has the right to 
make the selection in the first place. And the statements made at the 
1949 Diplomatic Conference by the Soviet delegates making it clear 
that they merely desired to limit the right of the Detaining Power 
to select a substitute for a Protecting Power to those cases where there 
is no existing Power of Origin was a limitation as to which there 
should have been no dispute. It is to be hoped that by overruling the 
Soviet thesis the 1949 Diplomatic Conference did not establish the 
proposition that a Detaining Power may, on its own, select and desig-
nate a substitute for a Protecting Power even though there is a Power 
of Origin in being. 
The fourth paragraph of Article 10 establishes two requirements 
for any neutral Power or organization invited by the Detaining Power 
to perform the functions of a Protecting Power (pursuant to the sec-
ond paragraph of Article 10) or any humanitarian organization in-
vited by the Detaining Power or itself offering to perform the hu-
manitarian functions normally performed by a Protecting Power (pur-
suant to the third paragraph of Article 10) : first it must act with a 
sense of responsibility toward the Power of Origin ;66 and, second, it 
must furnish assurances that it has both the capability and the intent 
to perform the allocated functions and to perform them impartially.67 
The fifth paragraph of Article 10 prohibits the derogation of the 
prior provisions of Article 10 by special agreements between the 
Detaining Power and the Power of Origin in those cases where the 
latter is unable to negotiate with the Detaining Power on terms of 
equality because of "military events" or the occupation of all or much 
of its territory.68 Inasmuch as any such derogation would "adversely 
affect the situation of prisoners of war," no matter what the relative 
status of the two Powers, it was already prohibited by the last sen-
66 This requirement clearly indicates that the designation by the Detaining 
Power of a substitute for a Protecting Power is not limited to instances where 
the Protecting Power has ceased to exist as an independent sovereignty-unless 
we are to assume that the sense of responsibility is owed to a Power of Origin 
despite the fact that it no longer exists. 
67 There is no indication as to whom the assurances are to be given. If the De-
taining Power is to be the recipient, and there does not appear to be any other 
entity that could or should be, the provision has little meaning-except as an ex-
hortation-as the Detaining Power, by making the selection, has disclosed its ac-
ceptance of the competence of the particular Power or organization. 
68 The wording of the provision appears to contemplate the parallel possibility 
that the Detaining Power might be the weaker Power in the negotiations, rather 
than the Power of Origin. As a practical matter, this is inconceivable. When 
"military events" go against a Detaining Power, or its territory is occupied by the 
enemy, it ceases to be a Detaining Power. See, e.g., Article XIX of the 1940 Fran-
co-German Armistice Agreement. 
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tence of the first paragraph of Article 6.69 However, the draftsmen 
of the Convention should certainly not be criticized for employing 
what might be characterized as an excess of caution for the protec-
tion of prisoners of war. They were unquestionably motivated by the 
events of World War II and an understandable desire to leave no 
doubt that there was a specific prohibition of such conduct in any 
future international armed confiict.70 
c. PERSONNEL OF THE PROTECTING POWER 
Article 8 of the Convention provides in part that 
... the Protecting Powers may appoint, apart from their diplo-
matic and consular staff, delegates from amongst their own na-
tionals or the nationals of other neutral Powers. The said delegates 
shall be subject to the approval of the Power with which they are 
to carry out their duties. 
It is obvious that the Convention has accorded to a Protecting Power 
three sources of personnel for the performance of its functions as 
such Protecting Power: its diplomatic and consular officers stationed 
within the territory of the Detaining Power;71 others of its nationals 
specifically appointed for the purpose; and nationals of other neutral 
Powers specifically appointed for the purpose. 
The normal and natural source of personnel for the execution of 
the functions of a Protecting Power is, of course, the diplomatic and 
consular personnel of the Protecting Power already assigned to and 
stationed in the territory of the Detaining Power. These officials. 
working under the ambassador, are experienced, they are known to 
the officials of the Detaining Power, and, perhaps most important, 
they are already present within the area in which the Protecting 
Power is to operate. It is, of course, true that they already have their 
60 It is difficult to understand why Article 10 is included in the list of articles 
in the first paragraph of Article 6 as one of the articles of the Convention ex-
pressly providing for special agreements, inasmuch as the prohibition mentioned 
in the text is the only reference in the Article to such agreements. 
70 After France and Beigium had capitulated in 1940, and were substantially 
(France) or completely (Belgium) occupied, Germany refused to continue to 
recognize a Protecting Power for either of them and required the "governments" 
of the two countries to act on behalf of the prisoners of war whom Germany con-
tinued to hold. 2B Final Record 112. The French "Scapini Mission" and the Bel-
gian "T'Serclaes Mission" rarely succeeded in obtaining a solution favorable to 
the prisoners of war of any problem that arose; and frequently they acted as 
agents to fulfill German demands which violated the provisions of the 1929 Con-
vention, rather than as "substitutes" for the Protecting Powers. 
71 Neither the 1929 Convention nor the Stockholm Draft that served as the 
working document at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference included the term "con-
sular" in specifying the authorized representatives of a Protecting Power. The 
authorization for the use of this category of personnel by Protecting Powers was 
proposed by Australia during the Conference and was unanimously approved. 2B 
Final Record 58. 
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usual functions to perform; but many of these functions disappear 
or are seriously curtailed upon the advent of war (commercial, immi-
gration, tourists and tourism, etc.). While any large-scale armed con-
flict of lengthy duration will undoubtedly make it necessary for Pro-
tecting Powers to supplement their regular diplomatic and consular 
staff within the territory of the Detaining Power, there will be num-
erous instances in which the Protecting Power will be able to perform 
its functions with only its normal complement of officials, at least for 
some considerable period of time and until the number of prisoners 
of war held by the Detaining Power makes necessary a buildup of 
the personnel performing the functions of the Protecting Power. Of 
course, the term "diplomatic and consular staff" includes not only 
those officials of the Protecting Power who were already stationed 
within the territory of the Detaining Power at the time of the desig-
nation of the Protecting Power, but also any of its other diplomatic 
and consular personnel who may be sent to replace or supplement them. 
With the heavy commitments that Switzerland had during World 
War II, it would obviously have been impossible for it to have made 
even a pretense of performing its farfiung responsibilities as a Pro-
tecting Power without a considerable increase in its staffs in the 
territories of the many Detaining Powers where it had agreed to serve 
as a Protecting Power. To meet its personnel requirements in this 
respect, the Swiss Government recruited locally and in Switzerland 
and then sent to its various affected embassies and legations "camp 
inspectors," who had the assigned duty of visiting prisoner-of-war 
camps and labor detachments to assure that there was compliance by 
the Detaining Power with the provisions of the 1929 Convention. This 
is typical of the second source of Protecting Power personnel, the use 
of which is authorized by the first paragraph of Article 8 of the 1949 
Convention-the noncareer national who is selected by the government 
of the Protecting Power solely for the purpose of assisting it to per-
form the functions of that office.72 These individuals may also be 
nationals of another neutral Power, the third source of Protecting 
Power personnel authorized, but normally the Protecting Power would 
resort to this type of selection only after it had exhausted its own 
manpower potential. Of course, a major source of noncareer person-
nel is to be found among the nationals of the Protecting Power (and 
of other neutral Powers) who are residing within the territory of 
the Detaining Power when the use of additional personnel becomes 
72 The Convention appears to use the term "representative" for the diplomatic 
and consular personnel of the Protecting Power and "delegate" for the noncareer 
personnel, whether nationals of the Protecting Power or of another neutral State. 
Throughout this study the term "representative" has been used to include all in-
dividuals performing duties for the Protecting Power qua Protecting Power, with-
out regard to their prior status. (The word "delegate" is used with respect to the 
lCRe personnel. This latter is in accordance with the Convention practice.) 
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necessary. The Protecting Power may find it more convenient, when it 
has exhausted the manpower pool of its own nationals residing within 
the territory of the Detaining Power as a source, to use nationals of 
other neutral Powers residing within the territory of the Detaining 
Power before resorting to the policy of recruiting its own nationals in 
its own territory and sending them to the territory of the Detaining 
Power.73 
It will have been noted that these noncareer, or auxiliary, persons, 
selected to assist in the performance by the Protecting Power of its 
functions under the Convention, are subject to the approval of the 
Detaining Power. This provision was the occasion for considerable 
discussion at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference. No obj ection can be 
perceived to this procedure. The diplomatic and consular personnel 
of the Protecting Power stationed within the territory of the Detain-
ing Power must have the normal approval of government of the 
Power to which they are accredited (agrement, exequatur) required 
for all such personnel, and anyone of them may, at any time, be 
declared persona non grata by that Power. There is certainly no reason 
why the individuals who will serve as supernumeraries to the Embassy 
of the Protecting Power in the territory of the Detaining Power for 
the purposes of the Convention should be subject to fewer restrictions 
than the career personnel of the Embassy and the consular corps who 
will actually be the first to perform the functions of a Protecting 
Power for their country.74 
73 The problem of the availability of competent personnel to serve as super-
numeraries has been a matter of concern for a considerable period of time and 
to many organizations. See, e.g., Resolution XXII of the XXth International Con-
ference of the Red Cross, held in Vienna in 1965, reproduced in 1971 GE Docu-
mentation, II, at 020; Articles 2-5 of the Regulations Drafted by the Commission 
Midico-Juridique de Monaco in 1971, reproduced in U.N., Human Rights, A/8370, 
at 80-81 (English) and in 1972 I.L.A. Rep. 307 (French); 1971 GE Report 108, & 
114; 1972 Basic Texts 7; and Article 6 of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol. 
(This latter, with some editing has become Article 6 of the 1977 Protocol I.) Thus, 
Europeans without training or experience are likely to cause problems if given 
duty in an area with a completely unfamiliar climate and culture. A camp inspec-
tor who reports that the prisoners of war are not getting enough meat, when 
they are receiving their national diet of fish and rice, is not being very helpful; 
nor is the inspector who criticizes the Detaining Power for not providing mat. 
tresses when it has furnished the prisoners of war with the pallets on which they 
are accustomed to sleep. 
74 Siordet, Scrutiny 27. A provision of the Stockholm Draft that served as the 
working document at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference would have required a De-
taining Power to give "serious grounds" for any refusal to approve the nomina-
tion of a noncareer individual by a Protecting Power. Revised Draft Conventions 
54; 1 Final Record 75. This proposal was c;mpletely lacking in logic. A State need 
give no reason for refusing to agree to the assignment to a post in its territory 
of a member of the diplomatic or consular service of a Protecting Power, or for 
declaring such an individual persona non grata. Why, then, should it be required 
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The fear has been expressed that a Detaining Power might arbi-
trarily refuse to approve any of the auxiliary personnel nominated 
by the Protecting Power and thereby make it impossible for the latter 
to perform its functions properly. But a Detaining Power so minded 
could also, and with equal ease, arbitrarily decline to grant the neces-
sary agrement or exequatur to replacement or supplementary diplo-
matic or consular personnel of the Protecting Power, or even declare 
persona non grata a number of the persons in these categories already 
serving within its territory. Any of these acts would constitute a viola-
tion of the spirit, and probably of the letter, of the Convention. More-
over, the Protecting Power, a friendly neutral Power, might well con-
sider any such action by the Detaining Power as an unfriendly act. 
Requiring the Detaining Power's approval of the individual super-
numeraries is also logical from another standpoint. The individuals 
concerned will, in the performance of their duties, be required to do 
considerable traveling in a country at war. Any country at war will 
have instituted controls on the right to enter into and to travel within 
its territory. To tell it that it must accept anyone selected by the Pro-
tecting Power, even though it has good reason not to trust the par-
ticular individual, is to close one's eyes to the facts of life. And for 
this same reason, the Detaining Power must retain the right to declare 
members of the staff of the Protecting Power persona non grata, 
whether the individual concerned has diplomatic, consular, or auxiliary 
status. 
It has been stated that the representatives of the Protecting Power 
engaged in fulfilling its obligations in the territory of the Detaining 
Power, have a triple responsibility: to their own government; to the 
government of the Power of Origin; and to the government of the 
Detaining Power.75 If this is another way of saying that these indi-
viduals must be completely :peutral and unbiased, it is correct. It would, 
however, be less controversial to state, as did United States Secretary 
of State Bryan in 1914, that they are "representatives of a neutral 
power whose attitude toward the parties to the conflict is one of im-
partial amity."76 
d. FUNCTIONS OF THE PROTECTING POWER 
With only a very few exceptions, the draftsmen of the 1949 Con-
vention apparently thought it best to avoid any attempt to specify in 
detail the functions of a Protecting Power or even to include functions 
in the form of specific powers granted to a Protecting Power. Most 
frequently the functions are expressed either in the form of duties of 
to do so with respect to noncareer supernumeraries? The provision of the Stock-
holm Draft was deleted at Geneva. 2B Final Record 58, 110. 
75 de LaPradelle, Le controle 344. See also note 27 supra. 
76 See note 11 supra. See also Franklin, Protection 114. 
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the Detaining Power or of rights of the prisoners of war. Where a 
precedent had previously been established, it is usually set forth in 
appropriate detail. Where no precedent had previously been estab-
lished, the problem is frequently left to ad hoc decision. It was prob-
ably anticipated that such problems would be solved by the Protecting 
Power through the exercise by it of the basic power guaranteed to it 
by the first paragraph of Article 8, that of surveillance to ensure that 
there is, at all times, full compliance with the provisions of the Con-
vention; reinforced by the provisions of the second paragraph of 
Article 8, which require the belligerents to facilitate "to the greatest 
extent possible" the work of the Protecting Powers. Should a Pro-
tecting Power ascertain that there is a default in the performance by 
the Detaining Power with respect to a particular provision, it is prob-
ably assumed that it will advise the Detaining Power thereof, and find 
some means of procuring a correction of the situation, even though 
the procedure by which it is to accomplish this is not specified.77 
Nevertheless, the Convention does contain repeated references to 
the institution of the Protecting Power and a function may usually 
be implied in a particular instance merely from such reference. It is 
indeed difficult to categorize these varied references to the Protecting 
Power. Extremely broad categories are required and even then not 
every function will fall within them. Several partially successful 
efforts have been made to list these references on a functional basis.78 
This discussion will consider them under three very general categories: 
(1) powers and duties; (2) liaison functions; and (3) miscellaneous 
functions. 
(1) Powers and Duties 
The basic and overriding power granted to a Protecting Power by 
the 1949 Convention is, of course, that contained in the' first paragraph 
of Article 8, the very first sentence of which, as we have seen, states 
tnat the Convention "shall be applied with the cooperation and under 
the scrutiny of the Protecting Powers whose duty it is to safeguard 
Ithe interests of the Parties to the conflict."79 Strangely enough, the 
77 At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference the representative of New Zealand, Quen. 
tin-Baxter, made the following statement: "It is not the function of the Protecting 
Power to command or to overrule: it is its fuction to observe, to comment, to make 
representations, and to send reports to the outside world. If we are faced with an 
unscrupulous belligerent, the presence of the Protecting Power and the ability of 
the Protecting Power to examine what is going on and to observe is the only pre-
ventive measure which we have." 2B Final Record 344. 
78 Thus, Heckenroth, Puissances protectrices 135 and Janner, Puissance pro-
tectrice 52, have each listed seven separate categories of functions of the Protect-
ing Power, but the lists coincide with respect to only four functions. Still a third 
functional listing appears in Pictet, Commentary 98-99 (reproducing a list that 
had originally appeared in Siordet, Scrutiny 73-75). 
79 See p. 262 supra, 
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only extended debate on this extremely crucial article that took place 
at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference concerned the selection of the 
proper word to characterize the activities of the Protecting Power, and 
that debate, it developed, occurred primarily as a result of difficulties 
of translation. The delegates at the Conference were agreed that the 
Protecting Power could not give orders or directives to the Detaining 
Power. The idea desired to be conveyed was that the authority of the 
Protecting Power would entitle it to verify whether the Convention 
was being properly applied and, if necessary, to suggest measures on 
behalf of prisoners of war.SO In the text of the Stockholm Draft, the 
working draft used at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, the words 
"under the supervision of the Protecting Powers" were used in the 
English version and the words "sous le controle des Puissances pro-
tectrices" in the French. This was acceptable to the French-speaking 
delegates but was opposed by those whose mother tongue was English. 
It eventually became apparent that the two groups were actually in 
agreement and that the seeming dispute had arisen because the word 
"controle" in French is much weaker than either "control" or "super-
vision" in English. The English-speaking delegations were given a 
choice of a number of words to be used as a counterpart for the French 
word, and unanimous agreement was ultimately reached on the word 
"scrutiny."SI 
The importance of the first paragraph of Article 8 may, perhaps, 
be found to lie in the very generality of its phrasing. The fact that 
the entire Convention is to be "applied with the cooperation" of the 
Protecting Power undoubtedly empowers the latter to make sugges-
tions to the Detaining Power with a view to the improvement of the 
lot of the prisoner of war even with respect to areas in which no 
specific reference is made to the Protecting Power. Thus, a Protecting 
Power might suggest to, and seek to obtain the agreement of, the 
Detaining Power that certain specified types of offenses committed 
by prisoners of war be uniformly punished by disciplinary rather 
than judicial measures, even though Article 83 contains no reference 
to the Protecting Power. Similarly, the fact that the Convention is 
to be applied "under the scrutiny" of the Protecting Power undoubted-
ly empowers it to investigate, and to request reports from the Detain-
ing Power, in unspecified areas. Thus, a Protecting Power might seek 
from the Detaining Power a complete report as to the reason for the 
prohibition of correspondence, even though Article 76, dealing with 
this subject, contains no mention of the Protecting Power; and, again, 
it might seek a report as to the action taken with respect to a com-
plaint made by a prisoner of war or a prisoners' representative, 
80 2B Final Record 110. 
SI Ibid. For some of the many English words proposed, see ibid., 19-20 & 57-58. 
See also Siordet, Scrutiny 24-25. 
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through the Protecting Power, regarding the conditions of capitivity, 
even though the second and fourth paragraphs of Article 78, which 
provide for such complaints, do not specifically provide for such 
reports. 
The first two paragraphs of Article 126 empower the representa-
tives of the Protecting Power to visit all places where prisoners of 
war may be, themselves selecting the places they will visit and de-
termining the frequency of the visits; to have access to all premises 
where prisoners of war are confined; to go to the place of departure, 
passage, and arrival of prisoners of war who are being transferred ;S2 
and to interview prisoners of war and prisoners' representatives with:-
out witnesses.s3 The background of these provisions warrants dis-
cussion. 
As we have seen, the difficulties encountered by Protecting Powers 
early in World War I gradually disappeared and, before its conclu-
sion, the Protecting Powers were generally enabled by the Detaining 
Powers to visit and inspect prisoner-of-war camps.84 Thereafter, the 
second paragraph of Article 86 of the 1929 Convention authorized 
the Protecting Power to visit any place, "without exception," where 
prisoners of war were interned.s5 Despite the clear import of this 
provision, early in 1940 problems were again encountered in this 
area.S6 However, apart from Japan, and, to some extent, Germany, 
the Detaining Powers and the Protecting Powers of World War II 
were largely able to resolve these difficulties in due course. Unfortun-
ately, even though the problem which had arisen with regard to visits 
to prisoner-of-war camps in occupied territories was well known, the 
draftsmen of the 1949 Convention took no clear-cut action to ensure 
against its recurrence. True, the first paragraph of Article 126 author-
izes the representatives of the Protecting Power "to go to all places 
where prisoners of war may be, particularly to places of internment, 
82 See pp. 187-194 supra. 
83 See p. 283 infra. 
84 See note 13 supra. See also Charpentier, La Convention de Geneve 38-39. 
85 Two widely disparate authors have termed this the most important activity 
of the Protecting Power (Janner, Puissance protectrice 52) and one of the most 
important saieguards ior prisoners of war (Mason, Prisoners of War 41). 
86 6 Hackworth, Digest at 285. In particular, difficulties continued to be en-
countered with respect to visits to prisoner-oi-war installations located in oc-
cupied territories despite the "without exception" clause in the 1929 Convention. 
Ibid.j I.M.T.F.E. 1129. (Article XI of the 1917 Anglo-Turkish Agreement had 
specifically excluded prisoner-oi-war camps located in occupied territory from 
those which the representatives of the Protecting Powers would be permitted to 
visit. It may be assumed that this was one of the reasons for the "without excep-
tion" provision in the subsequently drafted 1929 Convention.) 
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imprisonment and labour" ;87 and the second paragraph thereof states 
that such representatives "shall have full liberty to select the places 
they wish to visit"; and it was without any doubt the intent of the 
1949 Diplomatic Conference that these broad provisions should in-
clude prisoner-of-war installations located in occupied territories. 
However, any possibility of a dispute with regard to the interpreta-
tion of the quoted provisions could have been completely eliminated 
by merely adding the phrase "including those located in occupied 
territories" wherever appropriate. This was particularly desirable 
because the omission of the words "Wit!loUt exception" could arguably 
be construed as an intent to make the visitation privilege granted by 
the first two paragraphs of Article 126 less all-inclusive than it had 
been under the second paragraph of Article 86 of the 1929 Convention. 
During World War II a number of Detaining Powers required that 
the Protecting Powers provide them in advance with a schedule of 
proposed visits to prisoner-of-war installations. This was sometimes 
justified by the provision of the third paragraph of Article 86 of the 
1929 Convention, which stated that" [t]he military authorities shall 
be informed of their visits." During World War I it had frequently 
been found that this type of requirement rendered the inspection com-
paratively ineffective;88 and events of World War II disclosed the 
same deficiency. 59 The quoted provision of Article 86 of the 1929 Con-
vention was omitted from Article 126 of the 1949 Convention, which 
may be considered to be the successor article. However, there is no 
specific rejection of the requirement, and it is unlikely that Detaining 
Powers will discontinue the practice of requiring advance notice of 
visits of inspection by representatives of the Protecting Power.oo 
The procedure followed by the representatives of the Protecting 
Powers in conducting an inspection of a prisoner-of-war installation 
is not prescribed in detailS! and will largely be determined by the 
87 The right of visitation granted by the first paragraph of Article 126 is iter-
ated in Articles 56 as to labor detachments; 98 as to prisoners of war undergoing 
disciplinary punishment; and 108 as to prisoners of war undergoing judicial 
punishment. 
88 United Kingdom, Foreign Office, The Treatment of Prisoners of War in Eng-
land and Germany during the First Eight Months of the War 8 (1915); Charpen-
tier, La Convention de Geneve 39 & 43. 
89 Maughan, Tobruk 763; Mason, Prisoners of War 42. The ICRC delegates 
labored under the same handicap. 1 ICRC Report 230 & 244. 
90 United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Directive 
190-6,22 September 1970, Military Police; ICRC Inspection of Detainee/Prisoner 
of War Facilities, para. 6a, specified the action to be taken U[u]pon receipt of 
proposed itinerary of the ICRe delegation." In recommending the deletion of the 
provision requiring notice to the military authorities prior to a visit to a prisoner-
of-war installation, the leRe itself indicated that the procedure should be "settled 
by practice." Draft Revised Conventions 133. 
91 It may be noted that during World War II some Detaining Powers limited 
the number of visits which could be made to a prisoner-of-war installation by the 
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inspector himself, usually based upon specific instructions received 
from his goverenment, the Protecting Power.92 While the inspector 
will normally wish to visit every part of the installation (quarters, 
kitchens, mess halls, washrooms, toilets, showers, laundries, medical 
facilities, recreational and sports facilities, prison, etc., etc.), a great 
deal of his most valuable information with respect to deficiencies on 
the part of the Detaining Power will usually come from the prisoners' 
representatives and from the prisoners of war themselves. The second 
paragraph of Article 86 of the 1929 Convention permitted him to 
interview these individuals and provided that such interviews would 
be "as a general rule without witnesses." Such a provision was, of 
course, an invitation for the Detaining Power to make every case the 
one which does not fall within the general rule.93 This escape clause 
was properly omitted when the first paragraph of Article 126 of the 
1949 Convention was drafted, the words "as a general rule" being 
dropped so that the interview is now to be "without witnesses" in 
all cases.94 
Two practices have evolved with regard to the results of the inspec-
tions: first, the representative of the Protecting Power who makes 
representatives of the Detaining Power. Article 126 now provides in its second 
paragraph that "the duration and frequency of these visits shall not be re-
stricted." 
o2The checklist used by the United States as a Protecting Power in the early 
period of World War II may be found in Franklin, Protection 224-25. Concerning 
the checklist used by Switzerland, containing 50 items, see ibid., 224 n.83. One 
critic characterized the inspection visits as being "tres courtes et tres superficiel-
les." Tchirkovitch, Nouvelles conditions 106. Prisoners of war whose places of 
internment were visited usually felt otherwise. See, e.g., American Prisoners of 
War 30 & 39. There is always the danger that a camp inspector raised in one 
culture will be unable to make a proper evaluation of the facilities of a prisoner-
of-war camp that are established for (and, perhaps, by) individuals of a com-
pletely different culture. See, e.g., note 73 supra. 
93 I.M.T.F.E. Prosecution Exhibit No. 1965 included a set of Japanese "De-
tailed Regulations for the Treatment of Prisoners of War," dated 21 Apri11943. 
(This was probably a revision of an earlier set dated 31 March 1942. See I.M.T. 
F.E. 1107-08.) Article 13 of those Regulations provided that "a guard shall also 
be present at this interview." This provision was the subject of repeated, but un-
successful, objections by the Swiss Minister, representing the Protecting Power. 
I.M.T.F.E. 1132. 
M Here we are fortunate in having some very clear legislative history. The 
Australian delegate at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference proposed the elimination 
of the words "without witnesses" from the then Article 115 and the Venezuelan 
delegate strongly opposed such action. 2A Final Record 303. The matter was re-
ferred to Committee II which, in its report, did not adopt the Australian 
proposal. Ibid., 379. (In Franklin, Protection 227, the author states that dur-
ing World War II it was standard practice for the representative of the Protect-
ing Power to refuse to accept from, or to give to, a prisoner of war during the 
private interview any paper or object not previously passed by the camp author-
ities. The United States has indicated its expectation that this practice will con-
tinue. U.S. Army Regs. 633-50, para. 45c.) 
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the inspection will usually conclude his visit by discussing with the 
camp commander any objectionable practices which he has found to 
exist, thus seeking to eliminate them without the need for a formal 
report of the deficiency;95 and, second, the Protecting Power's formal 
report is submitted to the Power of Origin only, not to the Detaining 
Power.96 This latter practice probably evolved as a result of the desire 
of Protecting Powers to avoid being the recipient of recriminations 
from the Detaining Power because of an adverse report.97 However, 
the result is that, apart from any information received informally 
by the camp commander directly from the representative of the Pro-
tecting Power making the inspection, the Detaining Power is not 
advised of the existence of violations of the Convention of which it 
may be completely unaware, and there is no opportunity for the De-
taining Power to rectify the situation until it has attained the status 
of a formal protest by the Power of Origin. 
The importance of visits by representatives of Protecting Powers to 
all places where prisoners of war may be detained was emphasized 
during the hostilities in Vietnam, where the ICRC was permitted to 
perform the humanitarian functions of the Protecting Power, includ-
ing inspections of prisoner-of-war installations, in the Republic of 
Vietnam (South Vietnam), but not in the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (North Vietnam). The XXIst International Conference of 
the Red Cross, an international organization which includes as mem-
bers almost every national Red Cross Society in the world, meeting 
in Istanbul in 1969, adopted a resolution calling upon "all Parties to 
allow the Protecting Power or the International Committee of the 
Red Cross free access to prisoners of war and to all places of their 
detention" ;98 and the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted 
a resolution in 1970 calling upon "all parties to any armed conflict ... 
to permit regular inspection, in accordance with the Convention, of 
all places of detention of prisoners of war by a protecting Power or 
humanitarian organization such as the International Committee of 
the Red Cross."99 Even though these two calls were completely disre-
garded by the Democr~ctic Republic of Vietnam, they take their place 
in history as indicative of a widely acknowledged recognition of the 
need for the Protecting Power to be permitted to perform the ex-
tremely important function allocated to it by the Convention-the 
visitation to, and inspection of, all prisoner-of-war installations. 
95 Franklin, Protection 226-27; Rich, Brief History 487. 
96 Janner, Puissance protectrice 53; Rich, Brief History 487. For the different 
ICRC practice, see p. 311 infra: 
97 Franklin, Protection 225. 
98 Resolution XI, XXlst International Conference of the Red Cross, 9 I.R.R.C. 
614 (1969). 
99 G.A. Res. 2676, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 77, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). 
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The second paragraph of Article 78 grants to prisoners of war the 
right, which may not be restricted by the Detaining Power, to make 
complaints to the Protecting Power "regarding their conditions of 
captivity"-which, of course, means that they may complain to the 
Protecting Power regarding alleged failures of the Detaining Power to 
comply with the provisions of the Convention.100 These complaints 
may be made and submitted through the prisoners' representative, or, 
if the prisoner of war so desires, directly to the representatives of the 
Protecting Power.101 The third paragraph of Article 78 provides that 
if a complaint is made in writing it must be transmitted immediately 
and it may not be counted against the complaining prisoner of war's 
correspondence quota ;102 and, even if it is found to be without any 
foundation, such a complaint may not be the basis for the punishment 
of the prisoner of war by the Detaining Power.10a 
Other powers and duties of the Protecting Power are indeed varied. 
For example, the first paragraph of Article 11 directs it to lend its 
good offices to assist in settling disputes with respect to the applica-
tion and interpretation of the Convention ;104 the second paragraph 
of Article 65 authorizes it to inspect the finandal records of individual 
prisoners of war ;105 the first paragraph of Article 71 empowers it, 
in the overall interests of the prisoners of war, to permit the Detain-
ing Power to reduce below the specified minimum the number of 
items of correspondence which may be dispatched each month by 
each prisoner of war ;106 the third paragraph of Article 72 permits 
100 This practice originated in the bilateral agreements negotiated during the 
course of World War 1. See, e.g., Article LIV of the 1918 Anglo-German Agree-
ment and Article 118 of the 1918 United States-German Agreement. It was there-
after included in the second paragraph of Article 42 of the 1929 Convention. 
101 During World War II some Detaining Powers required that the complaint 
be in writing and be submitted through channels (e.g., German Regulations, NC}. 
20, para. 226) ; while others permitted it to be made orally and directly to the 
representative of the Protecting Power while he was visiting and inspecting a 
prisoner-of-war installation. POW Circular No.1, para. 165. 
102 See note II-179 supra. 
103 Article 120 of the 1918 United States-German Agreement made an unfound-
ed complaint a basis for punishment if it contained "intentionally insulting state-
ments or intentionally false accusations." This would provide too much latitude 
to the Detaining Power and would have a chilling effect on the exercise by pris-
oners of war of their right to complain. Article LIV of the 1918 Anglo-German 
Agreement merely permitted the Detaining Power to withhold complaints "which 
are intentionally false or are written in insulting language!' During World War 
II, on at least one occasion, the Japanese tortured a prisoner of war for daring 
to complain to the representative of the Protecting Power and prevented him from 
seeing the representative on the latter's next visit to the prisoner-of-war camp. 
[.M.T.F.E.1132-33. 
104 See p. 81 supra. 
105 See note II-470 supra. 
106 See p. 147 supra. 
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it, once again in the overall interests of the prisoners of war, to pro-
pose a limit on the number of packages which each prisoner of war 
may receive;107 the first paragraph of Article 75 allows it to take over 
the transport of capture cards, correspondence, packages, and legal 
documents should military operations prevent the Detaining Power 
from fulfilling its obligations in this respect ;108 the first paragraph of 
Article 96 gives it the right to inspect the records of disciplinary 
punishment ;109 and the second and fifth paragraphs of Article 105 
establish its duty to find counsel for a prisoner of war against whom 
judicial proceedings have been instituted, and its right to attend 
the trial.l1O 
(2) Liaison Functions 
In its liaison capacity the Protecting Power is actually little more 
than a conduit-but a very important one. It serves as the means of 
relaying necessary communications between the Detaining Power and 
the Power of Origin. Not infrequently, it will be the sole means readily 
available for the transmittal of messages between the two belliger-
ents. And, of course, while a great many liaison functions are speci-
fically set forth in the 1949 Convention, this is one area in which 
a protecting Power may improvise and undertake liaison missions which 
are not among those enumerated in the Convention. 
Article 23, paragraph three, requires the Detaining Power to give 
to the Protecting Power for relay to the Power of Origin information 
concerning the geographical location of all prisoner-of-war camps so 
that the prisoners of war will not, as has happened, accidentally be-
come the target of their own compatriots.111 The fourth paragraph of 
Article 60 provides that the reasons for any limitation placed by the 
Detaining Power on the amount of funds made available to prisoners 
of war from advances of pay must be conveyed to the Protecting Pow-
er, presumably for transmittal to the Power of Origin.ll2 The first 
paragraph of Article 62 obligates the Detaining Power to advise the 
Protecting Power, for relay to the Power of Origin, of the rate of 
daily working pay wp.ich it has fixed.ll3 Transmittals of funds by 
prisoners of war to recipients in their own country are, pursuant to the 
third paragraph of Article 63, made by notification from the Detain-
ing Power to the Power of Origin through the medium of the Pro-
107 See p. 161 supra. (The article fails to indicate to whom the proposal is to 
be made.) 
108 See P. 162 supra. 
109 See p. 325 infra. 
110 See lip. 334, & 336-337 infra. 
111 See p. 123 supra. 
112 See p. 200 supra. 
113 See p. 202 supra. 
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tecting Power.114 Notifications with respect to the status of the financial 
accounts of prisoners of war (Article 65, last paragraph) 115 and of 
prisoners of war whose captivity has terminated, through escape, 
death, or any other means (Article 66, first paragraph) 116 are also 
sent by the Detaining Power to the Power of Origin through the 
medium of the Protecting Power. The first paragraph of Article 68 
provides that claims of prisoners of war for injury or disease arising 
out of assigned work are similarly transmitted.ll7 Article 69 requires 
that information with respect to the measures taken by the Detaining 
Power to enable prisoners of war to communicate with the exterior 
must be transmitted to the Power of Origin through the Protecting 
Power.118 The first paragraph of Article 100 states that the Protecting 
Power must be informed, presumably for relay of the information to 
the Power of Origin, as well as for its own use, of all offenses pun-
ishable by death under the laws of the Detaining Power.1l9 And Ar-
ticle 128 provides that during the course of the hostilities each bellig-
erent will furnish to the other, through the Protecting Power, an 
official translation of the Convention (this assumes that the Party's 
language is other than English, French, Russian, or Spanish, in which 
languages there are, pursuant to Article 133, universal translations) 
and of all laws and regulations adopted to ensure the application 
thereof. 
In several instances the Convention provides for the exchange of 
information between the belligerents without specifying how this ex-
change is to be accomplished. Unquestionably, these are areas in 
which, as stated above, the Protecting Power would feel qualified to 
intervene, even though it has no specific mandate. For example, the 
last paragraph of Article 21 provides for an exchange of information 
between belligerents as to their respective laws and regulations on 
the subject of parole;120 the first paragraph of Article 43 provides 
for an exchange of information with respect to military titles and 
ranks;121 and the second paragraph of Article 43 requires the De-
114 See p. 208 supra. 
1111 See pp. 209-210 supra. 
116 See p. 211 supra. 
117 See p. 251 supra. 
118 See p. 153 supra. 
119 See p. 339 infra. This presumption is buttressed by the fact of the require-
ment of the second paragraph of Article 100 that other offenses may not there-
after be made punishable by death without the concurrence of the Power of 
Origin. 
120 See p. 400 infra. 
121 See p. 168 supra. Subparagraph (b) of Article 33, the comparable provision 
with respect to medical personnel, provides that the belligerents "shall agree at 
the outbreak of hostilities on the subject of the corresponding ranks of the medical 
personnel." To reach such an agreement the belligerents would assuredly avail 
themselves of the services of their Protecting Powers. 
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taining Power to recognize the promotions of prisoners of war of 
which it has been notified by the Power of Origin :122 but none of these 
provisions states how the information is to be exchanged or conveyed. 
The Protecting Powers are available and competent to perform this 
liaison function; and it may be assumed that either the belligerents 
will request their services for this purposes or the Protecting Powers 
will themselves offer their services for the transmittal of the required 
information. 
(3) Miscellaneous Functions 
There are a number of references to the Protecting Power in the 
1949 Convention which cannot rightly be designated as powers or 
duties, but which are likewise not precisely liaison functions. For lack 
of a more descriptive term, and because, for the most part, they bear 
little or no relationship to each other, they are here considered as 
miscellaneous functions. 
Thus, the second and third paragraphs of Article 12 provide that 
if a Detaining Power, to whom prisoners of war have been transferred 
by another Detaining Power, fails to carry out the provisions of the 
Convention with respect to those transferred prisoners of war, the 
transferor Detaining Power will, upon being notified to that effect 
by the Protecting Power, either take measures to correct the situation 
or request the return of the prisoners of war concerned.123 And the 
first paragraph of Article 58 indicates, without specifically so provid-
ing, that at some point after the outbreak of hostilities the Detaining 
Power and the Protecting Power will enter into an arrangement relat-
ing to the possession of money by prisoners of war.124 
The last paragraph of Article 60 directs the Detaining Power to 
provide to the Protecting Power "without delay" the reasons for any 
limitations imposed on the amount available to prisoners of war from 
their advances in pay; the last paragraph of Article 78 provides that 
the prisoners' representative may send periodic reports to the Pro-
tecting Power concerning the conditions of captivity and the special 
needs of the prisoners of war ;125 the fourth paragraph of Article 79 
requires the Detaining Power to inform the Protecting Power of its 
reason therefor when it refuses to approve a duly elected prisoners' 
representative ;126 and the last paragraph of Article 81 requires the 
122 See p. 169 supra. 
123 See pp. 105-106 supra. 
124 See p. 196 supra. 
125 See pp. 301-302 infra. Presumably, matters falling within the first area 
would be a basis for investigation upon the next visit of representatives of the 
Protecting Power to the particular prisoner-of-war camp; and matters falling 
within the second area would be passed on to the Power of Origin or to represen-
tatives of humanitarian or relief organizations operating in the territory of the 
Detaining Power. 
126 See p. 297 infra. 
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Detaining Power to inform the Protecting Power of its reasons for 
dismissing a prisoners' representative.127 In none of these articles is 
there any indication of the action which it is contemplated that the 
Protecting Power will take when the required information is given 
to it. While the information might, in the exercise of the Protecting 
Power's liaison function, be passed to the Power of Origin, in many 
cases this action alone would have little or no significance. However, 
under its general right to scrutinize the application of the Convention, 
the Protecting Power would undoubtedly, in appropriate cases, take 
issue with the Detaining Power's action. 
Further, the first two paragraphs of Article 121 provide that the 
Detaining Power shall investigate and make a full report to the Pro-
tecting Power with respect to every death or serious injury of a pris-
oner of war caused or suspected to have been caused by a sentry, 
another prisoner of war, or any other person, or where the cause of 
death is unknown; and the last paragraph of Article 121 provides 
that if guilt is indicated, the Detaining Power shall prosecute the 
responsible persons. Certainly, it is expected that the Protecting Power 
would forward a copy of the report of the incident to the Power of 
Origin; but it is equally certain that the Protecting Power would, 
on its own initiative, make demarches to the Detaining Power if it 
felt that the investigation had been inadequate or that a prosecution 
indicated by the investigation had not taken place.128 
It is believed that the foregoing short presentation of only a few 
of the provisions contained in the 1949 Convention clearly discloses 
that a Protecting Power has certain miscellaneous functions, both 
specified and unspecified, which can probably become whatever a 
particular Protecting Power desires them to be. 
(4) Limitations on the Activities of ~rotecting Powers 
The last paragraph of Article 8 imposes two specific limitations on 
the activities of the representatives of the Protecting Power: first, 
they may not exceed their mission; and, second, in performing their 
mission they must "take account of the imperative necessities of se-
curity" lpf the Detaining Power.129 Certainly, it should not even be 
127 See p. 299 infra. 
128 Pictet, Commentary 571. This was apparently the reaction of the ICRC, 
when performing the humanitarian functions of the Protecting Power in India in 
1972, to episodes involving the killing of a number of Pakistani prisoners of war 
by Indian guards. Washington Post, 23 December 1972, at A-16, col. 1. 
129 The Soviet Union had proposed a provision restricting the activities of the 
representatives of the Protecting Power with respect to "sovereignty," "security," 
and "military requirements." 2B Final Record 59. The French representative at the 
1949 Diplomatic Conference then made a substitute proposal which included not 
only the two limitations mentioned but also a 'proposed third sentence of the 
last paragraph of Article 8 discussed in the text. The Soviet proposal was rejected 
and the French proposal was adopted. Ibid., 74 & 110-11. 
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necessary to admonish a representative of the Protecting Power that 
he should not go beyond his mission. (If he does so, or attempts to 
do so, he will very quickly find himself persona non grata, not only 
to the Detaining Power but also to his own State, the Protecting 
Power.) There can therefore be no objection to this provision which 
is, at worst, surplusage. 
If we could be certain of the meaning of the directive to "take 
account of the imperative necessities of security" of the Detaining 
Power, we would be better able to judge the need for its inclusion in 
the Article. What are some of the "imperative necessities of security" 
of the Detaining Power? As we shall see in a moment, they are not 
"imperative military necessities." In any event, inasmuch as the rep-
resentatives of the Protecting Power are the ones called upon to make 
the ultimate decision, and not the Detaining Power, any attempt by 
the latter to restrict the activities of the representatives of the Pro-
tecting Power on the basis of "imperative necessities of security" 
when, in the considered opinion of such representatives there is no 
valid ground for such a restriction, would undoubtedly constitute a 
flagrant violation of the provisions of the Convention and would 
result in a protest by the Protecting Power and, probably, by the 
Power of Origin.130 
As originally approved, the last paragraph of Article 8 had a third 
sentence which did permit the Detaining Power to restrict the activi-
ties of the representatives of the Protecting Power "as an exceptional 
and temporary measure when this is rendered necessary by imperative 
military necessities."131 At that time an article indentical to Article 8 
was contained in the drafts of each of the four conventions then un-
der consideration at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference.132 When the 
matter eventually came before the Plenary Meeting, it was proposed 
that the limitation quoted immediately above be retained in the First 
and Second Conventions but that it be deleted from the Third and 
Fourth Conventions. The importance of the distinction drawn between 
the two pairs of conventions was fully appreciated at the time of the 
drafting of the conventions and was the occasion for some spirited 
debate.133 While on its face the decision reached by the Diplomatic 
130 Of course, if the representative of the Protecting Power decides that there 
are no "imperative necessities of security" to be taken into account and the Detain-
ing Power disagrees, the representative of the Protecting Power may shortly find 
himself persona non grata; but this will not affect his decision. 
131 See note 129 supra. 
132 It was the so-called Common Article 61717/7. In the final drafts of the four 
conventions it became Common Article 8/8/8/9. 
133 The proponents of the making of the distinction between the two pairs of 
conventions argued that it was "obvious and reasonable that the activities of a 
Protecting Power in sea warfare and on the field of battle must be restricted," but 
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Conference to adopt the proposal was plainly a victory for those 
who sought to exclude to the maximum extent the possibility of any 
shackles being placed on the Protecting Power in the performance 
of its functions with respect to prisoners of war, it remains to be 
seen whether this result was actually attained.134 
The second paragraph of Article 126, authorizing the representatives 
of the Protecting Power to select the prisoner-of-war installations 
which they desire to visit, continues to include in its provisions a 
restriction similar to the one that was stricken frem the last para-
graph of Artcle 8. It provides that such visits "may not be prohibited 
except for reasons of imperative military necessity, and then only as 
an exceptional and temporary measure."135 Assuming that the Detain-
ing Power desires to impose such "exceptional and temporary" re-
strictions on the visits of representatives of the Protecting Power to 
certain prisoner-of-war installations, or the even more extensive re-
strictions on the activities generally of the Protecting Power which 
are asserted by some States to exist, whether or not specified in the 
Convention, how and by whom is the decision to be made as to whether 
"imperative military necessity" does, in fact, exist? There is one school 
of thought which has advanced the position that it would be illogical 
to permit the determination to be made by the Detaining Power itself, 
as it would be judging its own case, and which insists that only the 
Protecting Power can validly make such a determination.136 While 
there is much to be said in favor of this position from a strictly 
humanitarian point of view, it cannot, as a practical matter, be justi-
fied. If, for example, the Detaining Power d~ems it essential to keep 
that as to the Prisoner-of-War and Civilians Convention "the vital force which 
animates those rules and gives them effect is the presence of the Protecting Pow-
er." 2B Final Record 344. 
134 The pessimism which may be apparent in the text is occasioned by the fact 
that the Soviet Union took the position that, even without such a restrictive lim-
itation in the Convention, it would exist in fact. Ibid., 345. It is to be feared that 
this attitude presages an attitude by the Soviet Union, with respect to the activi-
ties of the Protecting Power, similar to that taken by Japan during World War 
II. See note 21 supra. 
135 The failure to strike this provision from the second paragraph of Article 
126 when it was stricken from the last paragraph of Article 8 was not inadver-
tent. 2B Final Record 344-45. It is the sole area in which the Convention specifi-
cally permits the activities of the Protecting Power to be restricted by the Detain-
ing Power. While it is, of course, a very important one, it is not believed that a 
Detaining Power could really justify the imposition of such a restriction except 
in very rare cases, such as prohibiting visits to extremely forward collecting points 
during the course of an actual attack. 
136 Pictet, Commentary on the First Convention 101. Even there it is admitted 
that "this is precisely what it [the Protecting Power] would, in such a case, be 
debarred from doing. It will only be possible to show after the event whether or 
not the restriction was justified." In Pictet, Commentary 611, published 8 years 
later, a much more realistic approach was taken. 
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representatives of the Protecting Power temporarily out of an area 
where prisoner-of-war installations are located, lest military move-
ments therein inadvertently lead to the disclosure of important im-
pending military actions, there would be little logic in compelling it 
to advise the Protecting Power what and why it was so doing in order 
to permit the latter to determine whether imperative military neces-
sity actually existed and whether the restriction on visits to that area 
was really justified. This is unquestionably a matter which will adjust 
itself in the course of events and through reciprocal actions of the 
belligerents, inasmuch as time and experience will very quickly result 
in an informal mutual appreciation as to where the line is to be 
drawn.137 
3. Conclusions 
The past century has seen tremendous advances made in the con-
cept of the Protecting Power as an institution of international law 
both in the role which it is called upon to play and in the prestige 
which it enjoys and which contributes substantially in enabling it to 
perform the numerous functions which have now been assigned to it. 
It appears beyond dispute that 
The presence of the Protecting Powers today remains the sole 
means of putting a brake on the excesses of Detaining Powers, 
the sole element of moderation and of morality in the treatment 
of enemy persons, their belongings, and their interests; this was 
noted and affirmed many times at Geneva.13S 
The accomplishments of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference with re-
spect to the Protecting Power reveal clearly that the nations of the 
world were generally prepared to erect a solid basis for its activities. 
It was assigned a mission of close observation of the application of 
the provisions of the conventions drafted at that Conference, includ-
ing the Prisoner-of-War Convention, a mission which necessarily 
incorporates within it a right to call to the attention of the Detaining 
Power any failure of performance which it finds and to report any 
such failure of performance to the Power of Origin; a sizable expan-
sion was made in its specified functions and, correlatively, in its 
power of authority; provision was made for substitutes for Protect-
ing Powers in order to ensure that prisoners of war would at all times 
benefit from the presence and activities of a Protecting Power, thus 
correcting the situation which had arisen all too frequently during 
137 In Pictet, Commentary 611 the following remedial procedure is suggested: 
It • •• the Protecting Power will be able to check afterwards whether the prohibition 
of visits has been used by the Detaining Power to violate the Convention. In any 
event, it is not in the interests of the Detaining Power to misuse this reservation, 
because it would very soon be suspected of deliberately violating the Convention 
by evading supervision by qualified witnesses." 
138 Heckenroth, Puissances protectrices 229 (transl. mine). 
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World War II; and the use of the institution of the Protecting Power 
was extended not only to the redrafted First and Second Conventions, 
but also to the completely new Fourth Convention. These few exam-
ples alone demonstrate the great distance that had been traversed 
since 1907 when the Hague Regulations of that year contained no 
reference whatsoever to the Protecting Power. 
In many respects the provisions of the 1949 Convention relating 
to the Protecting Power, like its provisions in other areas, represent 
compromises. Positions reached solely in order to bring about agree-
ment between the extremes of opposing viewpoints can rarely be 
considered perfect, and the present case is no exception. However, it 
is better to have imperfect solutions which are acceptable to the great 
majority of States than to have perfect solutions which are accepta-
ble to, and will be complied with by, only a few States. The provisions 
of the 1949 Convention relating to the Protecting Power unquestion-
ably represent a great step forward in the evolution of the interna-
tional law of war and would undoubtedly be viewed with amazement 
by even the most humanitarian of those who drafted the first Red 
Cross Convention in 1864, or even by those who had acted on behalf 
of the Protecting Powers as recently as 1914, at the beginning of 
World War 1. 
The Protecting Power is now a generally accepted and firmly es-
tablished institution of international law. It is the subject of inter-
national agreements to which most of the States of the world are 
parties. It has been called upon to function during critical periods 
in recent world history and it has performed its mission in a satis-
factory manner. It is foreseeable that in any future major interna-
tional armed conflict it will be called upon by the belligerents to 
perform not only the missions specifically assigned to it in the 1949 
Convention, but also numerous new functions on behalf of States at 
war. 
c. THE PRISONERS' REPRESENTATIVE 
1. Historical 
The protective agency with which we shall now concern ourselves 
has come into being and evolved during little more than the past 
century as an institution of international law functioning uniquely 
in the prisoner-of-war area. Today it is known as the "prisoners' 
representative" in English and as the "homme de confiance" ("man 
of confidence") or "representant des prisonniers de guerre" ("pris-
oners' representative") in French; but it has had many other titles.139 
139 It has been known as the "spokesman," "man of confidence," "camp leader," 
"agent," "prisoners' representative," etc. See Maughan, Tobruk 781. The draft 
convention approved at Stockholm used the term "spokesman!' Revised Draft Con-
ventions 80-81. As late as 8 July 1949 the delegates at the Diplomatic Conference 
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The origin of the institution which has become the prisoners' rep-
resentative can be traced to the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) 
when the Prisoner-of-War Agency which the still very youthful ICRC 
had just brought into being140 recommended to the military authori-
ties of the belligerents-and the latter agreed-that one prisoner of 
war be designated as a "man of confidence" in each prisoner-of-war 
camp to be responsible for the receipt and distribution of collective 
relief supplies.l4l Despite the success of this innovation, the idea was 
not incorporated into either the 1899 or the 1907 Hague Regulations. 
However, it was widely adopted in the various World War I agree-
ments,142 and the prisoners' representative became an accepted fact 
which was duly institutionalized in Articles 43 and 44 of the 1929 
Convention. Moreover, the functions of the office had broadened con-
siderably since its initiation in 1870, no longer being confined to relief 
activities. Thus, Article 43 provided that the prisoners' representa-
tice (therein termed the "agent") should be entrusted "with repre-
senting them [the prisoners of war] directly with military authori-
ties and protecting Powers" as well as "with the reception and dis-
t~ibution of collective shipments." 
Like any other wartime relationship, the prisoners' representative 
did not always operate as intended during World War II.143 For 
example, some Detaining Powers disregarded the directive of the 
first paragraph of Article 43 that the prisoners of war should be 
allowed to "appoint" their own prisoners' representative ("agent") .144 
However, as far as the prisoners of war themselves were concerned, 
the prisoners' representative was a definite success ;145 and the real-
were still referring to the "spokesman" in their discussions. 2A Final Record 372-
73,380. The Draft Report of Committee II (Prisoners of War), distributed on 19 
July 1949 (ibid., 404), used the term "prisoners' representative" (ibid., 570, 591-
92) , and that term thereafter remained in the Convention. 
140 2 lCRC Report 5. See also note II-208 supra. 
141 Preux, Homme de confiance 449; 1 lCRC Report 342-43. 
142 Preux, Homme de confiance 450; 1 lCRC Report 343. 
143 The lCRC seems to have considered it improper that the transit camps in 
Great Britain did not have prisoners' representatives. Ibid. It is rather difficult to 
see how any Detaining Power could be expected to go through the formal proce-
dure of having prisoners of war select prisoners' representatives in transit camps 
with their daily prisoner-of-war population shifts. 
144 American Prisoners of War 1; 1 lCRC Report 343. 
145 Ibid., 345. One author has related an incident that occurred early during 
World War II when the general opinion among the prisoners of war was that the 
prisoners' representative was a rather useless office. As a result of an unsolved 
theft of German Government property, collective punishment consisting of loss of 
food for two days (a doubly prohibited penalty) was imposed on all of the prison-
ers of war at the camp where the theft had occurred, numbering some 20,000. The 
prisoners' representative complained to the camp commander and the collective 
punishment order was rescinded. "From that day we had a man who was our rep-
resentative and in whom we placed our confidence." Tedjini, Temoinage 632 
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ization of this was undoubtedly a strong motivating factor in the 
further institutionalizing of the prisoners' representative as well as 
the further extensive broadening of his functions which are to be 
found in the 1949 Convention.U6 
2. Selection of the Prisoners' Representative 
The first paragraph of Article 79, the introductory paragraph of 
the chapter of the 1949 Convention dealing with prisoners' repre-
sentatives, is concerned with the manner of selecting these individ-
uals, who are to represent the prisoners of war of their installation 
before the military authorities of the Detaining Power, the Protecting 
Power, the ICRC, and any other aid organization. They are to be 
"freely elected," the vote is to be by "secret ballot," an election is to 
be conducted every six months, or when a vacancy occurs, and the 
prisoners' representative is eligible for .reelection. None of these pro-
visions was to be found in the 1929 Convention. None of them would 
seem to present any serious problem of interpretation or application; 
but that problems can be created where none appears to exist has 
already been frequently demonstrated. Thus, the events in Korea dem-
onstrated that when belligerents care little about the rule of law, or 
about what happens to their own personnel who have been captured, 
they can and will ruthlessly disregard any provisions of a humani-
tarian convention if they consider that their ultimate objective will 
be better served by such a procedure. The North Korean and Chinese 
prisoners' representatives in the prisoner-of-war camps maintained 
by the United Nations Command were interested in furthering the 
Communist political cause and not in ensuring the protection of their 
fellow prisoners of war.147 And the selection of prisoners' representa-
tives among the United Nations Command personnel in Communist 
prisoner-of-war camps, particularly those maintained by the Chinese, 
was a farce-but not a humorous one.14S And while the practices in 
this regard in the prisoner-of-war camps maintained by the South 
Vietnamese was far from reaching the nadir of Communist practices, 
prisoners' representatives were frequently selected by the camp com-
mander, rather than by the prisoners of war.149 
(trans!. mine). This article by a former French prisoner of war, himself a long-
time prisoners' representative, gives a valuable insight into life in a prisoner-of-
war camp in general (the author was a prisoner of war from June 1940 to May 
1945) and the activities of a prisoners' representative in particular. 
146 The prisoners' representative is mentioned in 18 different articles and in two 
Annexes of the Convention. 
147 Vetter, Mutiny 65; UNC., Communist War 5-6. 
148 U.K., Treatment 16-17; Miller, The Law of War 246. The activities of some 
of these "progressive" prisoners' representatives were undoubtedly one of the 
reasons for the drafting and promulgation of Article IV of the Code of Conduct. 
149 Vietnam, Article-by-Article Review, Article 78. 
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There are not a few Powers among the present community of 
nations who consider it to be "democratic" to present the voter with 
a ballot containing no alternatives-in this case, with a single candi-
date, probably handpicked by the camp commander. Can it then be 
said that the prisoners of war are being permitted to "freely elect" 
their prisoners' representative? What if the camp commander rejects 
any candidate for prisoners' representative whom he considers "unfit," 
refusing to permit the name of any candidate to appear on the ballot 
unless the individual concerned has previously demonstrated his will-
ingness to "collaborate" with the camp authorities? Could the can-
didate who emerges successfully from this type of screening be "en-
trusted with representing" the prisoners of war in disputes with the 
camp authorities concerning the conditions of captivity? Is a ballot 
"secret" when the military authorities of the Detaining Power insist 
upon examining it before it is placed in the ballot box? All of these 
procedures were followed by the Chinese Communists in Korea.15o 
And, unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that they will not 
be the manner in which prisoners' representatives will be selected 
in any future major international armed conflict involving like-mind-
ed nations as belligerents. 
However, we must assume that the governments of the large ma-
jority of States that are Parties to the 1949 Convention are law-
abiding and will apply the provisions of the Convention in good faith, 
and that practices such as those adopted by the Chinese Communists 
in Korea will be the exception rather than the rule. Based upon that 
assumption, any prisoner of war may be a candidate for election as 
the prisoners' representative at the installation in which he is con-
fined; the prisoners of war of that installation will cast their secret 
ballots for the candidate of their choice; and the candidate receiving 
the greatest number of votes will be elected.l5l At this point the 
Detaining Power may legally impose its will upon the election-but 
only negatively. Under the provisions of the fourth paragraph of 
Article 79 the successful candidate for prisoners' representative may 
not assume his functions in that capacity until he has been approved 
by the Detaining Power.152 If the Detaining Power refuses to approve 
him, it would appear, although it is not specifically so provided, that 
150 See note 148 supra. 
151 If the prisoners' representative so elected is not the ranking individual in 
~he prisoner-of-war camp, acceptance of his status by the other American ser-
vicemen in the camp might well be a violation of Article IV of the Code of Conduct. 
See the Instructional Material for this article of the Code. 
152 It should be noted that this requirement of approval of the prisoners' repre-
sentative by the Detaining Power applies only to one who is elected and that it 
therefore does not apply to the prisoners' representative who obtains his office by 
virtue of being the senior officer present. See text in connection with note 156 
infra. 
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the prisoners of war would have no alternative but to continue to 
conduct elections until an individual acceptable to the Detaining Power 
has been elected. By this method a Detaining Power probably could, 
eventually, bring about the election of a collaborator just as success-
fully as it could by improperly controlling the names which appear 
on the ballot. That is, of course, basically the same problem which 
was encountered with respect to the provisions of the first paragraph 
of Article 8 that require Detaining-Power approval of the represen-
tatives of the Protecting Power.lli3 There is one additional safeguard 
here against arbitrary action by the Detaining Power-if it refuses 
to approve and accept the elected prisoners' representative, it is re-
quired to advise the Protecting Power of the reason for such action.lM 
However, the Protecting Power is apparently so advised for informa-
tional purposes only, as the Convention does not authorize it to take 
any action even if it considers the reason given by the Detaining 
Power to be totally without basis. Nevertheless, the need to advise 
the Protecting Power of its disapproval and of the' reason therefor 
should constitute at least a small brake on completely arbitrary action 
by the Detaining Power and will, in some cases, undoubtedly inhibit 
repetitive arbitrary disapprovals of the individual chosen by his fel-
low prisoners of war to be their representative in dealing with the 
Detaining Power. 
The election of a prisoners' representative just discussed refers to 
a prisoner-of-war installation in which no officers are confined. The 
second paragraph of Article 79 covers the other two possibilities: 
camps where there are only officers; and camps where there are both 
officers and enlisted men.1/i5 In either such case, the senior officer 
present is automatically the prisoners' representative.lli6 If there are 
only officers in the camp, one or more "advisers" are to be "chosen" 
by the other officer prisoners of war; if it is a mixed camp, with 
1153 See p. 278 supra. 
lli4 This resembles the procedure which was originally included in, but was de-
leted from, the first paragraph of Article 8. See note 74 supra. 
llili Retained medical personnel and chaplains are not prisoners of war (S66 pp. 
71-72 supra) and are, therefore, not included under these provisions. Subpara-
graph (b) of Article 33 places upon the senior medical officer in a camp the duties 
with respect to retained medical personnel, officer and enlisted, that the prisoners' 
representative has with respect to prisoners of war. Chaplains act individually 
on behalf of themselves only. Like the senior medical officer, each has access to 
the camp commander. Pictet, Commentary on the First Convention 249-50; U.S. 
Army Regs. 633-50, para. 32e. 
lli6 Apparently some question arose as to whether this was so under the last 
paragraph of Article 43 of the 1929 Convention, as that Article used the term 
"intermediary" for the senior officer present, rather than the term "agent," used 
throughout that Convention to signify what we now call the prisoners' represent-
ative. Preme, Homme de confiance 457; 1 ICRC Report, 346; Rich. Brief History 
898. The wording of the second paragraph of Article 79 clarifies the former am-
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both officers and enlisted men, one or more "assistants" are to be 
"elected" by the latter.157 
There is one set of circumstances under which the senior officer 
present will not necessarily be the prisoners' representative. The third 
paragraph of Article 79 provides that officer prisoners of war of the 
same nationality as the enlisted prisoners of war constituting a labor 
detachment shall be assigned to such detachments to perform the 
necessary administrative duties and that these officers "may be elect-
ed as prisoners' representatives." In other words, even though the 
. labor detachment will, to a certain extent, be a "mixed" camp, the 
senior officer detailed to it to perform the administrative details will 
not automatically be the prisoners' representative, but he will be 
eligible for election to that office.I58 
The prisoner of war who is elected prisoners' representative or who 
occupies such office by virtue of his seniority of rank must, of course, 
be one who is interned in the prisoner-of-war installation in which 
he is to function as prisoners' representative. The last paragraph of 
Article 79 establishes certain other qualifications that must be met: 
he must always have "the same nationality, language and customs 
as the prisoners of war whom he represents." Inasmuch as the third 
paragraph of Article 22 provides that prisoners of war are to be 
assembled in camps or camp compounds according to the same three 
criteria,159 this should cause no particular problems. Moreover, if 
prisoners of war with different nationalities, languages, and customs 
are confined in different compounds in the same prisoner-of-war 
biguity. The senior officer present is specifically stated to be the prisoners' repre-
sentative. One author sees a conflict of interest for this officer between the re-
quirements of the Convention (to further the welfare of his fellow prisoners of 
war) and those of the Code of Conduct (to defeat the enemy). Smith, Code of Con-
duct 112. Such a situation would certainly seem to have the same reprehensible 
characteristics as those attributed to the Communist prisoners' representatives in 
the United Nations Command camps in Korea. See text in connection with note 
147 supra. 
157 The functions of the "advisers" and the "assistants" are probably intended 
to be identical, the difference in terminology being a recognition of the military 
hierarchy. Preux, Homme de confiance 457. Preux also explains the use of the 
word "chosen" for the officers instead of the word "elected" used for the enlisted 
men as being the result of a desire to avoid imposing the formality of an election 
on the officers. Ibid., 458. Presumably the officers would make their choice by some 
type of consensus. 
158 Ibid., 459. If an officer is elected prisoners' representative, his assistants 
must be enlisted men. 
159 See p. 175 supra. 
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camp/60 each compound is to have its own prisoners' representative, 
so that each such prisoners' representative will meet the stated quali-
fications.16l 
There are two methods by which a Detaining Power may rid itself 
of a prisoners' representative whom it finds to have gadfly character-
istics-dismissal162 and transfer. Article 81 envisages the possibility 
that a Detaining Power may dismiss a prisoners' representative in-
asmuch as its last paragraph provides that in such an event the 
Protecting Power must be informed of the reasons therefor.163 As 
is the case when the Detaining Power conveys to the Protecting Power 
the reason for its refusal to approve a prisoners' representative who 
has been elected, the Convention merely calls for the communication 
of the information and does not authorize the Protecting Power to 
pass on the merits of the action. Of course, the dismissal would mean 
that a vacancy existed and, under the first paragraph of Article 79, 
this would necessitate a new election. 
The fifth paragraph of Article 81 foresees situations in which the 
prisoners' representative may be transferred away from the prisoner-
of-war camp in which he is performing his functions. If he is so 
transferred, he ceases to occupy the position of prisoners' represen-
tative. This is obviously a simple way for the Detaining Power to 
160 The last paragraph of Article 79 refers to "different sections of the camp," 
while the third paragraph of Article 22 refers to "camp compounds." The latter 
is the technical term properly applied to the subdivisions of a prisoner-of-war 
camp. (It might also be noted that both the third paragraph of Article 22 and the 
first sentence of the last paragraph of Article 79 used the terminology "national-
ity, language and customs" (emphasis added), while the second sentence of the 
last paragraph of Article 79 substitutes an "or" for the "and" in both the Eng-
lish and the French versions of the Convention. Obviously, the use of the disjunc-
tive in this instance was intentional.) 
161 This practice had, apparently, been followed by at least some Detaining Pow-
ers during World War II. See, e.g., German Regulations, No. 22, para. 266. It 
would seem to eliminate the problem involving the United States Code of Conduct 
that might arise in a camp with prisoners of war from the United States armed 
:forces if the senior officer in the camp were from the armed force of another 
Power of Origin. But see Manes, Barbed Wire Command 17. 
162 Although the Convention is silent on the subject, it is not believed that the 
Detaining Power could dismiss an officer prisoners' representative of a prisoner-
of-war camp, as he would continue to be the senior officer present and there is no 
provision for anyone other than the senior officer to be the prisoners' representa-
tive in a camp with either an all-officer or a mixed prisoner-of-war population. 
163 In the debriefing which occurred after the repatriation of prisoners of war 
at the end of World War II, a former prisoner of war :from Stalag 2B (in Ger-
many) stated that after he had served as the camp prisoners' representative :for 
almost a year, the Germans refused to deal further with him as prisoners' repre-
sentative when they discovered that he was Jewish. American Prisoners of War 55. 
It would appear that there is no provision of the 1949 Convention which would 
prohibit this :from being given by a Detaining Power to a Protecting Power as 
the "reason" for the dismissal of a prisoners' representative. 
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rid itself of a prisoners' representative whom it considers "undesir-
able," as it need not even devise a reason to give to the Protecting 
Power. The only limitation on its right to take this action is the 
requirement that it must give the prisoners' representative sufficient 
advance notice of the proposed transfer to allow him a reasonable 
period of time in which to brief his successor with regard to current 
problems. 
Reference has been made to the selection of officer advisers or en-
listed assistants when the prisoners' representative is an officer. Apart 
from these, Article 81 provides in its second paragraph that the pris-
oners' representative may himself select such additional assistants as 
he may require. Although the Convention does not mention the De-
taining Power in this regard, it may be assumed that the latter will 
have some veto power if it decides that the prisoners' representative 
is attempting to use too many prisoners of war as assistants, par-
ticularly because, as we shall see, the prisoner's representatives and 
all of his assistants are paid out of canteen funds or, if there are 
none available, then by the Detaining Power.l64 
One aspect of the provisions dealing with the subject of the desig-
nation of prisoners' representatives is somewhat confusing. The sec-
ond paragraph of Article 56 provides that labor detachments "shall 
remain under the control of and administratively part of a prisoner 
of war camp"; yet the third paragraph of Article 79 indicates that 
"labor camps"165 are to have their o'\vn prisoners' representatives. It 
has been suggested that the prisoners' representative in the labor 
detachment represents the other prisoners of war of that detachment 
vis-a-vis the detachment commander, while the camp prisoners' rep-
resentative represents them vis-a-vis the camp commander when a 
problem is not resolved at the lower leve1.166 This is probably as good 
a solution as can be devised, even though the labor detachment pris-
oners' representative is not designated as an assistant to the camp 
prisoners' representative by the Convention. Moreover, such a system 
of hierarchical echelons would definitely not be applicable to the pris-
oners' representative of the various compounds containing prisoners 
of war of different nationality, language, and customs selected pursu-
ant to the fifth paragraph of Article 79, each of whom would be of 
164 But see Preux, Homme de confiance 469-70. He believes that, while the De-
taining Power may express its displeasure at the number of assistants designated 
by the prisoners' representative, the final decision is to be made by the latter. 
165 This is apparently just another instance of careless draftsmanship. There 
is no doubt that it refers to the "labor detachments" of Article 56. 
166 Preux, Homme de confiance 456. The fourth paragraph of Article 81 indirectly 
supports this interpretation as it provides that communications between the pris-
soners' representative in the labor detachment and the prisoners' representative 
of the principal prisoner-of-war camp are not to be included in the personal mail 
quotas established under the first paragraph of Article 71. 
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equal stature and equally entitled to direct access to the camp com-
mander and to the representatives of the Protecting Powers. 
3. Functions of the Prisoners' Representative 
The prisoners' representative has three major functions and a 
myriad of less important ones. The major functions are (1) repre-
senting the prisoners of war before the military authorities, the Pro-
tecting Power, the lCRe, and other similar organizations [Article 
79, first paragraph]; (2) furthering their physical, spiritual, and 
intellectual well-being [Article 80, first paragraph]; and (3) super-
vising their organization for mutual assistance and collective relief 
[Article 80, second paragraph].167 
The third paragraph of Article 81 authorizes a prisoners' repre-
sentative to visit all premises where prisoners of war are detained. 
Obviously, this provision refers to premises constituting a part of 
the prisoner-of-war installation of which he is the prisoners' repre-
sentative. Moreover, this same paragraph provides that all prisoners 
of war (of the particular installation) must be permitted to consult 
freely with the prisoners' representative ;168 and they are authorized, 
by the second paragraph of Article 78, to submit complaints concern-
ing the conditions of their captivity to the prisoners' representative 
for transmittal to the Protecting Power. To reinforce this latter pro-
vision, the first paragraph of Article 126 requires that the Protecting 
Power be permitted to interview the prisoners' representative without 
witnesses; and the clear implication of the second paragraph of Ar-
ticle 126 is that this may be done as often as the Protecting Power 
desires. Of course, by this method the prisoners' representative wI1l 
be in a position to present to the representative of the Protecting 
Power not only the complaints formally submitted to him for trans-
mittal, but also those which he has received informally, as well as 
any that he desires to make himself, particularly as, in his capacity 
161 The first paragraph of Article 80 assigns to the prisoners' representative the 
broad function of furthering "the physical, spiritual and intellectual well-being of 
prisoners of war." Preux believes that the three major functions of the prisoners' 
representative are relief activities, relations between the prisoners of war and the 
military authorities, and supervision of the application of certain guaranties ex-
pressly provided by the Convention. Ibid., 464. The present author would, for the 
most part, include the last function enumerated by Preux under the major fune-
tion of representing the prisoners of war before the military authorities. U.S. DA 
Pam 27-161-2, at 84, has still a third list of the functions of the prisoners' rep-
resentative. 
168 In an attempt to preclude a recurrence of one situation noted during World 
War II that left certain prisoners of war with virtually no channel of eomplaint 
concerning the conditions of their captivity, frequently very bad, the second para-
graph of Article 57 specifically provides that prisoners of war employed by private 
individuals or concerns shall have the right to communicate with and to receive 
communications from the prisoners' representative of the prisoner-of-war camp to 
which they are administratively assigned. (See p. 246 supra.) 
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as prisoners' representative, he will usually be aware of all that is 
transpiring in the camp.169 When the information that he has thus 
received and the inquiries that he has made indicate that the De-
taining Power is not complying fully with the provisions of the Con-
vention, the prisoners' representative may conclude that the particular 
violation is of a nature that can be corrected by bringing it to the 
attention of the camp commander; or he may decide that it is of a 
nature that requires that it be brought to the attention of the Pro-
tecting Power.l7° If he follows the former path, only to learn that 
the camp commander denies that the procedure objected to consti-
tutes a violation of the Convention, or that he refuses to take any 
action (perhaps because the condition objected to has been specifically 
ordered by higher military authority of the Detaining Power), the 
prisoners' representative would clearly have no alternative but to pass 
the complaint on to the representative of the Protecting Power under 
the authority contained in the last paragraph of Article 78. 
The second paragraph of Article 41 provides that all regulations, 
orders, notices, and pUblications issued by the Detaining Power and 
pertaining to prisoners of war must not only be posted in the prisoner-
of-war camps in a language which the prisoners of war understand, 
but that copies must be furnished to the prisoners' representative. 
He is thus in a position to ensure that the contents of such docu-
ments are in accord with the Convention and that the prisoners of 
war are actually made aware thereof. Moreover, he then has a file 
of all such documents and will be in a position to intervene to ensure 
that prisoners of war are not punished for the violation of a rule 
which has not been properly promulgated by posting and delivery 
to the prisoners' representative, or where the violation occurred be-
fore the rule was properly so promulgated. 
As we have seen, the first paragraph of Article 79 bestows upon 
the prisoners' representative the function of representing the pris-
oners of war "before the military authorities." There can be no 
question that the camp commander and his subordinates come within 
this terminology-but what of the higher military authorities of the 
Detaining Power, right up to the Ministry of Defense itself? One 
author considers in inconceivable that a camp prisoners' representa-
tive should communicate directly with the military authorities of 
the Detaining Power superior to the camp commander.l7l There is 
169 During World War II the prisoners' representative is stated to have had the 
tasks of "forwarding of petitions and complaints, making of enquiries, and collect-
ing of information." 1 JeRe Report 344. 
170 Of course, he should winnow out the complaints which are without basi8, 8S 
the submission of groundless complaints merely detracts from the weight given to 
valid ones. Ibid., 345. 
171 Preux. Homme de confiance 456. 
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considerable merit to this view. However, the fourth paragraph of 
Article 81 provides that the prisoners' representative must be accord-
ed facilities for "communication by post and telegraph with the de-
taining authorities."172 Surely, the draftsmen of the Convention did 
not believe that the prisoners' representative had a need for these 
facilities merely in order to communicate with the camp commander 
of his own prisoner-of-war camp. It would thus appear that the pris-
oners' representative has at least an implied right to communicate 
directly with any level of the military authorities of the Detaining 
Power ;173 but it would also appear that when he is unable to obtain 
satisfaction from the camp commander he would be well advised to 
channel his resort to higher authority through the Protecting Power, 
rather than to use the implicit right of direct communication. 
During World War II the German military authorities ordered that, 
in general, all searches of prisoner-of-war quarters for security pur-
poses should be accomplished in the presence of the prisoners' repre-
sentative or his equivalent.174 This appears to fall within the category 
of relations with the military authorities and is a logical function 
of the prisoners' representative. On the other hand, the United States 
issued an order making the prisoners' representative ("spokesman") 
responsible for the "maintenance and cleanliness of the quarters."175 
This does not appear to be the type of function which should be 
assigned to the prisoners' representative.176 
It is, perhaps, appropriate to mention at this point several of the 
provisions of the Convention that were included in order to protect 
the prisoners' representative and to facilitate his mission. Thus, the 
first paragraph of Article 81 provides that he is not to be required 
to perform any other work if to do so will make the accomplishment 
of his mission more difficult. Inasmuch as the functions of the pris-
oners' representative in most prisoner-of-war camps will be full time, 
not only for the prisoners' representative himself but also for his 
assistants, this position will normally mean that he should not be 
172 In explaining this provision at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, the represen-
tative of the ICRC referred to its provisions for communicating "with the Protect-
ing Power and the various relief organizations," pointedly omitting any reference 
to the fact that the "detaining authorities" were also mentioned therein. 2A Final 
Record 289-90. 
173 U.S. Army Regs. 633-50, para. 32, provides that postal and telegraph facili-
ties will be made available to the prisoners' representative for the purpose of com-
municating with, among others, "United States Army authorities." This certainly 
appears to refer to military authorities at a higher level than the camp commander. 
174 German Regulations, No. 44, para. 811. 
175 POW Circular No.1, para. 44. 
176 It must be borne in mind that the prisoners' representative has no disciplin-
ary powers, all such powers residing exclusively in the Detaining Power. See the 
third paragraph of Article 96. See also German Regulations, No. 82, para. 511; 
U.S. Army Regs. 633-50, para. 32k. 
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required to perform any other work.177 The third paragraph of Article 
80 provides that the prisoners' representative may not be held re-
sponsible ex officio for offenses committed by other prisoners of war. 
This is particularly relevant with respect to incidents such as the 
construction of a tunnel to be used for the purpose of escape. The 
military authorities of the Detaining Power will probably assume, 
and with some justification, that this could not have occurred unknown 
to the prisoners' representative--but whether he knew of it or not, 
he is not to be held responsible if he did not personally participate 
in it.178 
We have just seen that a prisoners' representative may appoint the 
assistants that he considers necessary and that he may visit all of the 
premises constituting a part of the prisoner-of-war installation of 
which he is the prisoners' representative. In order that he be physically 
able to exercise this right of visitation, the second paragraph of Ar-
ticle 81 requires the Detaining Power to grant him "a certain free-
dom of movement" so that he may visit labor detachments under his 
jurisdiction, as well as the points at which relief supplies are received, 
warehoused, issued, etc. The fourth paragraph of Article 81 not only 
instructs the Detaining Power to facilitate the prisoners' representa-
tive's efforts to communicate by post and telegraph with the military 
authorities, the Protecting Power, the ICRC, the Mixed Medical Com-
missions, and other aid organizations,179 but also that such communi-
cations are not to be counted against the personal mail quotas estab-
lished under the first paragraph of Article 71.180 
Finally, the third paragraph of Article 62 provides that the prison-
ers' representative, his advisers, and his assistants shall receive their 
working pay181 out of the canteen fund, with the prisoners' represen-
177 In officers' camps and in mixed camps this will present no problem, as the 
senior officer present will be the prisoners' representative and officers may not be 
compelled to work. See p. 224 supra. If an officer is elected prisoners' representa-
tive of a labor detachment, he will probably be required to continue to work, both 
because his official duties should not be that onerous and because he was specifi-
cally assigned to the detachment to perform necessary administrative functions 
(for which he had, presumably, volunteered). 
178 This is another prohibition of vicarious punishment in a specific instance. 
For the general prohibition of collective punishment, see Article 87, third para-
graph. 
179 Note the difference between the enumeration set forth here and that set forth 
in the first paragraph of Article 79. See p. 295 supra. Concerning the Mixed 
Medical Commissions, see pp. 411-412 infra. 
180 It is possible to interpret the provision concerning mail quotas as being ap-
plicable only to communications between the prisoners' representative of a labor 
detachment and the prisoners' representative of the principal prisoner-of-war in-
stallation. However, it is believed that the broader interpretation given in the text 
is not only more logical but that it is supported by the legislative history. See 2A 
Final Record 405. 
i81 Concerning "working pay," see pp. 201-205 supra. 
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tative himself setting the scale of such payments, subject to the ap-
proval of the camp commander. Should there be no canteen fund, then 
the Detaining Power is required to pay these individuals "a fair work-
ing rate of pay." No provision is made as to how the fair working rate 
of pay is to be set, so it appears that the Detaining Power would 
make that decision. It certainly could not establish a scale of pay 
for the prisoners' representative and his staff that was less than that 
established for the prisoners of war generally under the first para-
graph of Article 62.182 
With respect to the prisoners' representative's function of further-
ing the physical, spiritual, and intellectual well-being of the prisoners 
of war, established by the first paragraph of Article 80 of the Con-
vention, there is little to say. All of the discussions of the activities 
of the prisoners' representative during World War II agree that the 
prisoners' representatives were extremely active and successful in 
this field, organizing sports, orchestras, and theatricals, establishing 
camp libraries and publications, arranging for educational facilities, 
and sometimes even acting in a spiritual capacity.183 
It will be recalled that the office of the predecessor of the prisoners' 
representative, the "man of confidence," was specially created for the 
purpose of providing a reliable prisoner of war who would supervise 
the organization of the prisoners of war for mutual assistance and 
collective relief.184 Under the provisions of the second paragraph of 
Article 80 this remains one of the major functions of the prisoners' 
representative. The second paragraph of Article 73 states specifically 
that even a special agreement between the belligerents cannot affect 
the prisoners' representative's function of taking possession of all 
collective relief shipments and of distributing them or otherwise dis-
posing of them in the interests of the prisoners of war.185 Annex III 
to the 1949 Convention, entitled Regulations concerning Collective 
Relief, contains the detailed rules with respect to the receipt, ware-
housing, distribution, and other disposal of collective relief supplies 
that are to apply in the absence of a special agreement. In all aspects 
of this matter, the prisoners' representative has both the responsi-
182 During the discussion of pay for prisoners' representatives in the Subcom-
mittee of Financial Experts at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, it was suggested 
that if the prisoners' representative were to be paid by the Detaining Power, the 
latter might be able to use this as a source of pressure on the former. 2A Final 
Record 541. Nevertheless, the alternative method of payment adopted is exactly 
the one concerning which the warning was issued. 
183 1 ICRC Report 344-45; Preux, Homme de confiance 462, 470; Tedjini, 
Temoinage 633. 
184 See p. 294 supra. 
185 Article 125, fourth paragraph, requires the prisoners' representative to fur-
nish a receipt for relief supplies received from relief organizations. This gives 
some assurance to the donors that the supplies donated actually reached the pris-
soners of war and were not intercepted and used by the Detaining Power. 
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bility and the power for the handling of all collective relief supplies 
at his prisoner-of-war camp.1S6 
The various functions of the prisoners' representative that we have 
just discussed are those that he exercises on behalf of the entire 
prisoner-of-war population of the prisoner-of-war installation that 
he represents. In addition, there are many functions that he exercises 
on behalf of individual prisoners of war. Thus, under the third para-
graph of Article 48 he will ensure that the personal (and community) 
property that prisoners of war, transferred from his prisoner-of-war 
camp to another one, were unable to take with them because of the 
weight limitations contained in the preceding paragraph of Article 48, 
is forwarded to them; under Annex V, implementing the third para-
graph of Article 63, he countersigns, with the prisoner of war con-
cerned, the notification of the transmittal of funds abroad from the 
personal account of the prisoner of war ;187 under the first paragraph 
of Article 65 he countersigns entries in the account of a prisoner of 
war on behalf of the individual concerned; under the fourth para-
graph of Article 96 he must be advised of any disciplinary punish-
ment pronounced against a prisoner of war ;188 under the last para-
graph of Article 98 he is to be given custody of parcels and remit-
tances of money addressed to individual prisoners of war who are 
undergoing confinement as a disciplinary punishment, and he is given 
the authority to donate any perishable items contained in such parcels 
to the camp infirmary; under the last paragraph of Article 104 he 
is to receive the same advance notice of the Detaining Power's inten-
tion to institute judicial proceedings against a prisoner of war that 
the Protecting Power receives ;189 under the first paragraph of Article 
107 he is to receive the same notice of a judgment and sentence 
pronounced upon a prisoner of war, and of appellate rights, that the 
Protecting Power receives ;100 and under the last paragraph of Article 
113 he has the right to be present at the examination by a Mixed 
Medical Commission of any prisoner of war who presents himself for 
that purpose.191 
It is obvious that the many functions delegated to the prisoners' 
representative reach into every activity in the prisoner-of-war camp 
affecting the prisoners of war. The extent of the impact of his activi-
ties upon the daily life of the prisoners of war is incalculable. An effi-
cient prisoners' representative can literally mean the difference be-
tween survival or death for the prisoners of war confined in camps 
186 Concerning relief supplies generally, see pp. 158-163 supra. 
187 Concerning the transmittal of funds abroad, see pp. 207-208 supra. 
188 See p. 325 infra. 
189 See note V-85 infra. 
190 See p. 338 infra. 
191 See p. 412 infra. 
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maintained by some Detaining Powers. While using common sense and 
carefully selecting his fields of battle, he must be prepared to challenge 
any action of the Detaining Power, or its representatives, that he con-
siders to be a violation of the provisions of the Convention and con-
trary to the best interests of the prisoners of war. The strong and 
competent prisoners' representative will quickly win the confidence 
of the prisoners of war whom he represents and the respect of the 
prisoner-of-war camp commander and his staff. When he has accom-
plished this, he has already done much to improve the lot of the 
prisoner-of-war population of the camp of which he is the prisoners' 
representative. 
D. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS 
1. Historical 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) came into 
being as a result of the fact that Henri Dunant, a Swiss civilian, was 
a witness to the postbattle horrors resulting from the battle of Sol-
ferino (June 1859) between the Austrians and the Allies (primarily 
the French). Approximately 40,000 of the 300,000 men who partici-
pated in that battle were killed or wounded during its course of little 
more than 12 hours-and, subsequently, there were thousands of addi-
tional deaths from among the participants, many of them because of 
the lack of any system of organized medical care.192 In November 1862 
Dunant's book, Souvenir de Sollerino (Memory of Solferino) was 
published in Geneva; in February 1863 the "Committee of Five," the 
genesis of the ICRC, was created by the Geneva Public Welfare Soci-
ety; an International Conference, called by the Committee of Five, met 
in Geneva in October 1863 ; and on 22 August 1864, less than two years 
after the publication of Dunant's book, the Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the 
Field had been drafted and signed by a Diplomatic Conference called 
by the Swiss Government.193 This was the first of the long series of 
humanitarian Geneva Conventions which culminated in the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949.194 
102 For the story of this episode and its humanitarian repercussions, see gener-
ally Gumpert, Dunant--the Story of the Red Cross. 
193 All of the major European and several American States had been invited to 
participate in the Diplomatic Conference. The United States, then engaged in the 
American Civil War, was represented by an observer. It did not ratify the 1864 
Convention until 1882. 
104 The national delegates to the Diplomatic Conference for the Reaffirmation 
and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Con-
flicts, which met in Geneva in 1974, 1975, 1976, and 1977, signed a Final Act on 
10 June 1977 and signed a Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Con-
flicts (herein referred to as the 1977 Protocol I) on 12 December 1977. 
308 
Despite the first word in its title, the ICRC is not international (ex-
cept in its outlook). Its headquarters are located in Geneva; its mem-
bership is exclusively Swiss in nationality; and it maintains this 
membership by co-option. Not a little of the success of the ICRC may 
undoubtedly be attributed to the fact that, since the Congress of 
Vienna, Switzerland has existed under a state of perpetual neutrality 
which, unlike that of certain other small European states less fortu-
nate from the point of view of geography, has been maintained. This 
has ensured the ICRC not only the fact of neutrality, but an aura of 
neutrality, a situation that would have been impossible had it been 
based in any other country of today's world. 
Traditionally, the delegates of the ICRC have been found wherever 
there have been victims of disaster, natural or man-made. Earth-
quakes, floods, droughts, and armed conflicts, international or internal, 
all produce human victims; and all quickly bring an offer of assistance 
from the ICRC. We shall, of course, inquire into only its activities on 
behalf of prisoners of war in international armed conflict. 
2. The Position of the ICRC in International Armed Conflict 
Article 9 of the 1949 Convention contains the basic international 
recognition of the ICRC and its activities on behalf of prisoners of 
war. It states: 
The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle 
to the humanitarian activities which the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross ... may, subject to the consent of the Parties 
to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of prisoners 
of war and for their relief. 
It will be noted that this Article follows immediately after the basic 
Article with regard to the Protecting Power. This positioning was 
unquestionably intentional. During World War II it was sometimes 
necessary for the ICRC to exert great effort in order to overcome the 
impression of some belligerents that it was attempting to duplicate 
the functions of the Protecting Power. While it did, for the most part, 
succeed in convincing them that such was not the case195-by placing 
the two basic provisions of the Convention relating to the Protecting 
Power and the ICRC in such juxtaposition, and by the phraseology 
used-the 1949 Diplomatic Convention clearly indicated its expectation 
and intent that the two institutions could, without any interference in 
each other's activities, function side by side.196 
195 1 IeRe Report 39. 
196 Unquestionably, many of their activities are identical-but this was under-
stood and intended. How else can we explain a provision such as that contained in 
the last paragraph of Article 126 that specifically gives to the IeRe delegates 
"the same prerogatives" of visitation of prisoner-of-war installations as the first 
two paragraphs of Article 126 give to the representatives of the Protecting Power? 
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Moreover, recognizing the very real possibility of a shortage of 
states available to act as Protecting Powers in any future major inter-
national armed conflict, the first paragraph of Article 10 authorizes 
the belligerents "to agree to entrust [the duties of the Protecting 
Power] to an organization which offers all guaranties of impartiality 
and efficacy."191 The ICRC is unquestionably such an organization; 
and, as has already been noted, it has formally announced that, con-
trary to the position previously taken by it, it will in the future 
consider accepting an invitation to act in that capacity.198 
Furthermore, the second paragraph of Article 10 provides that, 
absent a Protecting Power or an organization designated under the 
first paragraph of that Article, the Detaining Power may designate a 
neutral Power, or such an organization as mentioned above, to perform 
the functions of a Protecting Power.190 The ICRC, of course, likewise 
meets the requirements for designation under this provision. And the 
third paragraph of Article 10 provides that when the Detaining Pow.er 
is unsuccessful in obtaining the required services under the second 
paragraph of Article 10, it may request or accept "the offer of the 
services of a humanitarian organization, such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, to assume the humanitarian functions 
performed by the Protecting Power."200 
From the foregoing it is clear that it was the hope of the 1949 Dip-
lomatic Conference that the Protecting Power and the ICRC would 
function simultaneously, supplementing each other, in order to pro-
vide the prisoners of war with the maximum protection and service; 
but that should there for any reason fail to be a Protecting Power, it 
was intended that the ICRC-or another similar organization, if such 
there be-should fill the vacuum and perform either all of the func-
tions of a Protecting Power, or, at least, all of its humanitarian func-
tions, if any of its functions were deemed not to fall within that 
category.20l 
3. Activities of the ICRC 
As we have seen, the provisions of the first two paragraphs of 
Article 126 authorize the representatives of the Protecting Power to 
visit all places where prisoners of war may be and give them wide 
1117 See note 58 supra. 
1118 See note 59 supra. 
109 See p. 271 supra. 
200 As has been seen (see note 43 supra), the leRe has now reached what is 
believed to be the correct conclusion that all of the functions of the Protecting 
Power are basically humanitarian in nature. It had previously felt differently. 
See notes 59 and 60 supra. 
201 When the ICRC, or any other organization, acts pursuant to either of the 
first three paragraphs of Article 10, it does so as a substitute for a Protecting 
Power, not as an actual Protecting Power which, by definition, must be a State. 
See note 2 supra. 
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latitude in performing this function.202 The fourth paragraph of that 
Article provides that the leRe delegates "shall enjoy the same pre-
rogatives."203 All that has been said in this respect with regard to the 
representatives of the Protecting Power is equally applicable to the 
delegates of the leRe. That the leRe performed this function, and 
performed it vigorously, is evidenced by the statistics-during World 
War II leRe delegates made a total of 11,175 visits to installations 
where prisoners of war and civilian internees were confined.204 During 
their visits the delegates of the leRe, like the representatives of the 
Protecting Power, have the right to interview prisoners of war and 
without witnesses.205 They will thus learn of the complaints of the 
prisoners of war concerning the conditions of their captivity.206 In 
addition to this parallel right of visitation,207 the leRe delegates are 
also given a parallel right of access to the prisoners' representative.208 
While the prisoners' representative can, and probably will, on occasion, 
advise the delegates of the leRe of deficiencies in the conditions of 
captivity,209 this is probably not the principal reason for giving the 
202 See pp. 281-284 supra. 
203 See note 196 supra. That paragraph also provides, like the last sentence of 
the first paragraph of Article 8 concerning the "delegates" of the Protecting 
Power, that ICRC delegates must be approved by the Detaining Power. 
204 1 ICRC Report 83. During and after the Sino-Indian War (1962), the Peo-
ple's Republic of China gave another example of its ability to disregard, or to mis-
interpret in its own interest, the clearest possible provisions of international agree-
ments voluntarily entered into by it. Despite the unambiguous provisions of the 
last paragraph of Article 126, the PRC took the position that this article did not 
apply to the ICRC! Draper, People's Republic 366. See also note 47 supra. 
205 A general statement of the procedure followed by an ICRC delegate during 
and after a visit to a prisoner-of-war installation is presented in Anon., The Pro-
tection of Prisoners of War. 141.R.R.C. 191. 
206 This right of the ICRC to interview prisoners of war without witnesses and 
to receive complaints was contested by some Detaining Powers during World War 
II. 1 ICRC Report 342. Of course, there was no specific provision such as the last 
paragraph of Article 126 in the 1929 Convention. However, these functions were 
performed by the ICRC during World War II. See, e.g., ibid., 346; and POW Cir-
cular No.1, para. 99. Although the ICRC is not mentioned in the second paragraph 
of Article 78, concerning complaints, it is somewhat difficult to visualize what else 
the ICRC delegate and the prisoner of war are going to discuss in the private in-
terviews that the last paragraph of Article 126 certainly authorizes. 
207 The right of visitation includes not only the prisoner-of-war camp, but "aU 
places where prisoners of war may be." For several other places specifically men-
tioned in the Convention, see note 87 supra. 
208 The first paragraph of Article 126, the fourth paragraph of Article 126, and 
the first paragraph of Article 79, and the fourth paragraph of Article 81 all auth-
orize communication between the prisoners' representative and the ICRC delegates. 
209 After almost a decade and a half of additional study of the subject, the author 
is inclined to be a little less sure that the legislative history of the second para-
graph of Article 78 establishes that the ICRC delegates are not authorized recip-
ients of prisoner-of-war complaints. See Levie, Prisoners of War and the Protect-
ing Power, 55 A.J.I.L. 374, 395-96, and particularly note 55 therein. As indicated 
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prisoners' representative and the delegates of the ICRC a mutual right 
of access. It will be recalled that the position which we now denomi-
nate the "prisoners' representative" was originally brought into ex-
istence for the purpose of supervising prisoner-of-war relief mat-
ters.210 It is undoubtedly in this area that the need for communication 
between the prisoners' representative and the delegates of the ICRC 
will be most needed and most useful. A very considerable part of the 
time of the ICRC delegates will be occupied with the extremely im-
portant function of ensuring that relief supplies, both from neutrals 
and, at times, from the Power of Origin, reach the prisoner-of-wa:t: 
camps where they are most needed and·are thereafter properly dis-
tributed. The provisions of the Convention having to do with relief 
matters uniformly place the ICRC on the special footing which it 
rightly deserves because of its traditional major interest in such 
matters.211 
The procedure followed by the ICRC in its relations with the oppos-
ing belligerents differs in one very material respect from that of the 
Protecting Powers-unlike the latter, who submit the reports of their 
visits to the Power of Origin only,212 the ICRC submits its . reports to 
both the Power of Origin and the Detaining Power ;213 in fact, if there 
is another Power concerned, as where the Capturing Power has trans-
ferred the custody of the particular prisoners of war to another De-
taining Power, such Capturing Power will also receive a copy of the 
ICRC report.214 There is much to be said for this practice.215 
It has already been mentioned that the ICRC originally conceived 
and executed the idea which brought into being the Central Prisoners 
of War Information Agency.216 Its continued interest and usefulness 
in this respect has been recognized in the first paragraph of Article 
123, authorizing the ICRC to propose to the belligerents (as it has 
done in the past) that such an Agency be organized. It may be as-
in the text here, it was probably not the principal reason for providing for com-
munication between the prisoners' representative and the ICRC-but the ICRC 
has traditionally performed the function of receiving complaints without a legis-
lative directive and the new guarantee of access in private practically ensures that 
it will continue to do so. 
210 See p. 294 supra. 
211 See, e.g., Articles 125; 72; 73; the first two paragraphs of Article 75; and 
Annex III, Article 9. For a review of ICRC relief activities during World War II, 
see 3 ICRC Report, passim. 
212 See p. 284 supra. 
213 1 ICRC Report 240-41; Rich, Brief History 489. 
2141 ICRC Report 241. Among their other improper actions, during World War 
II the Japanese insisted on censoring the copy of the reports sent by the ICRC to 
the Power of Origin. Ibid., 229. A censored report has, of course, little significance. 
215 A detailed outline of the matters covered by the report may be found at 1 
!CRC Report 233-38. 
216 See p .154 supra. 
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sumed that, in any future major international armed conflict, not only 
will the ICRC propose the organization of this central clearinghouse 
of information,217 but that it will, as it has in the past, assume the 
responsibility for the establishment and operation thereof.218 
The ICRC is a unique organization which has played an indispen-
sable humanitarian role in every armed conflict for more than a cen-
tury. There is every reason to believe that, if permitted to do so by 
the belligerents, it will continue to play such a role in future armed 
conflicts, making the life of prisoners of war on both sides more liv-
able and, in many cases, being the major reason for the survival of 
prisoners of war. It remains to be seen whether the ICRC will be 
permitted to perform the functions envisaged for it by the 1949 Diplo-
matic Conference, as it has been in the majority of cases, or will be 
denied the right to perform any of these functions, as it was by the 
Soviet Union (1940-45),219 North Korea (1950-53) ,220 the People's 
Republic of China (1950-53; 1962),221 and North Vietnam (c. 1965-
73).222 
E. OTHER IMPARTIAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS 
Article 9 of the 1949 Convention provides that humanitarian activi-
ties for the benefit of prisoners of war may be performed not only by 
the ICRC, but also by "any other impartial humanitarian organiza-
tion."223 The Convention does not identify any organization, other 
217 During a visit to the lCRC in Geneva the author was shown through the 
archives of the World War II Central Agency. The name of a close personal friend 
who had been a prisoner of war during World War II was mentioned-and in a 
matter of minutes his card was produced with entries showing the several pris-
oner-of-war camps in which he had been interned, with the dates of arrival at, and 
departure from, each one. 
218 For a review of the activities of the Central Prisoners of War Agency during 
world War II, see 2 lCRC Report, passim. 
219 1 lCRC Report 408-36. Having denied the lCRC the right to function on its 
territory during World War II, during the Korean hostilities (1950-53) the Soviet 
Union supported the charge of the Chinese Communists that the lCRe was a 
"capitalist spy organization." U.K., Treatment 33-34. Under the circumstances, it 
is unexpected, indeed, to find the Soviet Union communicating to the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the United Nations its belief in the need for the lCRC to undertake addi-
tional tasks relating to the protection of human rights in armed conflict. U.N., 
Human Rights, A/8052, at 119-20. 
220 The frustration of the lCRC in its attempts to be permitted to function in 
North Korea is well-documented in the two volumes of lCRe, Conjlit de Coree, 
passim. 
221 Draper, People's Republic, 353-67. 
222 lCRC Annual Report, 1970, at 40-41; ibid., 1972, at 40-41. The confidence 
in the lCRC which is typical of most States is demonstrated by the provisions of 
Article 81 (1), (2), and (3) of the 1977 Protocol I. 
223 The first paragraph of Article 10 refers to "an organization which offers all 
guarantees of impartiality and efficacy"; and the third paragraph of that Article 
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than the ICRC, which falls within the quoted term, nor does it amplify 
that term. However, it is possible to draw certain conclusions with 
respect to the nature of the organizations meant to be included within 
the term from analogous and collateral material. 
Article 88 of the 1929 Convention, which was the direct progenitor 
of Article 9 of the 1949 Convention, did not include the possibility of 
the intervention of any "humanitarian organization" other than the 
ICRC for the purpose of furnishing assistance to prisoners of war. 
That possibility received recognition for the first time at the 1949 
Diplomatic Conference when a proposal was made by the Italian rep-
resentative to add the words "or any other impartial humanitarian 
body" following the reference to the ICRC in the original draft of what 
became Article 9.224 It was adopted by the Joint Committee of the 
Diplomatic Conference after a debate in which the representative of 
the United States had supported the use for humanitarian purposes 
of "welfare organizations of a non-international character" and the 
Committee had rejected a Burmese proposal to narrow the Italian 
proposal to "any other internationally recognized impartial humani-
tarian body."225 It was approved at a Plenary Meeting of the Diplo-
matic Conference without debate.226 
The foregoing is the substance of the legislative history concern-
ing the addition of the words "or any other impartial humanitarian 
organization" to Article 9 of the 1949 Convention.227 There are clearly 
three basic requirements before an organization can claim to come 
within the meaning of the Article: first, it must be impartial in its 
operations; second, it must be humanitarian in concept and function; 
and third, it must have some institutional, operational, and functional 
resemblance to the lCRC. Negatively, it need not be international in 
creation and it need not be neutral in origin.228 
refers to "a humanitarian organization such as the ICRC." From the context it 
would appear that the draftsmen intended that an organization would have the 
same qualifications in any of the three situations, even though different words were 
used and different goals were sought. Article 81 (4) of the 1977 Protocol I refers to 
"the other humanitarian organizations referred to in the Conventions and this Pro-
tocol!' Article 5(4) of the Protocol adopts the language of the first paragraph of 
Article 10 of the 1949 Convention quoted above. 
224 2B Final Record 21. 
225 Ibid., 60 (emphasis added). 
226 Ibid., 346. 
221 At some point in the deliberations the word "body" was changed to "organ-
ization," but this author was unable to pinpoint the eVent-a result not unique to 
this particular matter. 
228 For a discussion in depth of this problem, see Levie, Repatriation 697-701. 
The organization referred to in note 58 supra would probably qualify. This author 
has strong reservations concerning both the "impartiality" and the "efficacy" of 
any alleged humanitarian organization with political parentage, such as one that 
is a creature of the United Nations. See pp. 18-19 supra. 
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Assuming, as we have, that the humanitarian organizations men-
tioned in Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention were intended to have 
identical qualifications, and that the ICRe serves as the prototype for 
"an impartial humanitarian organization," much that has been said 
with respect to the leRe would, in an appropriate case, be applicable 
to any organization authorized by one or more of the belligerents to 
function under either of those articles.229 Notable exceptions to the 
foregoing statement are to be found in the first paragraph of Article 
123 which refers only to the leRe in authorizing the proposal of the 
creation of a Central Prisoners of War Information Agency; the fourth 
paragraph of Article 123 which refers to the humanitarian activities 
of the leRe "or of the relief societies provided for in Article 125"; 
and the last paragraph of Article 126 which very pointedly assigns 
only to the leRe and its delegates the prerogatives enjoyed by the 
Protecting Power of visiting prisoner-of-war installations and inter-
viewing prisoners of war privately, with no mention whatsoever of 
any other organization of any kind.230 All in all, it may be said that 
while other humanitarian organizations recognized by one or more 
of the belligerents are accorded many of the privileges which the eon-
vention accords to the leRe, the latter still occupies a very special 
position insofar as assistance to prisoners of war is concerned.231 
229 While various terms are used to designate the other humanitarian organ-
izations (see, for example, the third paragraphs of Articles 72 and 73, the first 
'paragraph and subparagraph (b) of Article 75, and the first paragraph of Article 
79), the import of many of the provisions of the Convention, with the exceptions 
noted in the text, is that what the ICRC may do, another humanitarian organiza-
tion may do, if it has been approved by one or more of the belligerents. 
230 Conversely, the ICRC is not specifically mentioned in the first paragraph of 
Article 125, which requires the Detaining Power to provide the representatives of 
"religious organizations, relief societies, or any other organization assisting pris-
oners of war ... with the necessary facilities for visiting the prisoners [of war]." 
However, this right of visitation is not for the purpose of inspection or interview, 
but solely for the purpose of the distribution of relief supplies and other materials 
intended to improve morale; and even here, the third paragraph of Article 125 
recognizes the special position of the ICRC in this field. (Of course, an organiza-
tion designated as a substitute for a Protecting Power under the provisions of 
the three paragraphs of Article 19 would enjoy the prerogatives of visitation and 
interview under the provisions of the first two paragraphs of Article 126.) 
231 See Article 5 (3) and (4) of the 1977 Protocol I. 
